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I. INTRODUCTION 
If you’ve heard this story before, don’t stop me because I’d like to hear it 
again. 
—Comedian Groucho Marx (1890–1977) 
 
A. THE FOURTH THURSDAY OF OCTOBER 
Everyone knew it was coming; it was just a matter of when. In the days leading 
up to that fourth Thursday of October, and as the rumors grew to consensus, newsmen, 
bankers, and their chauffeurs were waiting anxiously for the organized support they 
believed was inevitable. After all, it was not the first time the markets faced such a crisis. 
Just seven months before, Charles E. Mitchell, president of the powerful National City 
Bank, stepped in and reassured the markets that the boom times would continue. He 
offered $25 million loans to show his support to the call side, leveraged speculators 
(Galbraith, 1961, pp. 42–43). Though it was unclear in what form the inevitable support 
would materialize, or who precisely would do the organizing, it was understood that the 
worse was over, and the titans of industry and finance would put a stop to the 
unreasonable fall in prices. After all, on Tuesday, Mitchell himself declared that “the 
decline had gone too far” and the economy was “fundamentally sound” (Galbraith, 1961, 
p. 102).   
By Wednesday, the market was looking ambiguously unsound, as the Times, Dow 
Jones Industrial Average fell by nearly 7.5% from 415 to 384 (Galbraith, 1961, p. 103). 
The morning hours of the next day, Thursday, were characterized by chaos, confusion, 
and fear, as boardrooms around the country saw near vertical price declines bleed across 
the ticker. Ticker printers themselves were falling more and more behind, desperately and 
futilely trying to keep up with volume twice as great as the previous record-holder, and 
four-fold greater than a typical day of heavy trading. By noon, the panic had subsided. It 
wasn’t that federal bureaucrats released positive data about the economy, nor that a 
particularly large firm, like General Electric or Ford Motor Company reported better-
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than-expected earnings, or even that some opportunistic politician announced a 
government spending program to get the economy back on track. In fact, word began to 
spread that an emergency meeting was being held at 23 Wall Street, then headquarters of 
J. P. Morgan and Company. At the head of the table was the much extolled, though later 
maligned, Charles Mitchell, also in attendance were the chairmen of both Chase National 
Bank and National City as well as the president of the Guaranty Trust Company; all 
hosted by the senior partners of J. P. Morgan (Galbraith, 1961, pp. 104–106). It was a 
room full of the nation’s most influential financiers, and what many hoped was an answer 
to the question of who would organize. While estimates vary greatly, most agree that the 
financiers purchased somewhere between $40 million to $240 million worth of securities, 
and by the end of the day, it was irrefutable that the support worked (Galbraith, 1961, 
p. 106). Disastrous morning losses were all but recouped before the markets closed that 
Thursday. Goldman Sachs, once trading down nearly 20 percent, recovered to close down 
a fraction above 1 percent. U.S Steel, a vocal target by the organized support, opened at 
205½, dropped to 193½, and closed at 206 – a net gain on the day of 2 points (Galbraith, 
1961, p. 108). With great success, the commended financial leaders of Wall Street had 
stepped in to provide sanity and liquidity to an increasingly irrationally volatile market. 
The worst had past, or so common knowledge would have suggested.   
The next two trading days after Black Thursday went largely unchanged, rising 
modestly Friday, and falling by nigh the same Saturday morning (the New York Stock 
Exchange did not remain closed on all Saturday’s until the 1950s) (Galbraith, 1961, pp. 
110–111). The calmer weekend markets gave the financial saviors ample opportunity to 
dispose of the shares they acquired propping up the market Thursday afternoon. So after 
a tranquil Sunday, the markets opened Monday morning when the real troubles returned 
in earnest. Just like the previous Thursday, the bottom fell out as the Times industrials 
shed more than 10% (Galbraith, 1961, p. 114). Regrettably, on Monday, unlike the past 
Thursday, support neither organized nor materialized in the waning open hours of the 
market. While the bankers did meet after the market closed, a statement released after the 
meeting adjourned, made it clear that the oracles of the financial district were not there, 
“to maintain any particular level of prices or to protect anyone’s profit” (Galbraith, 1961, 
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p. 115). The next day, Tuesday, October 29, 1929, would be the most devastating day in 
the New York stock market for 60 years. Shedding percentages nearly as great as 
Monday, with volumes well exceeding those of the past record setting Thursday, on 
Black Tuesday the financial leaders were silent. And so with a crash, an era branded by 
unemployment, stagnation, and hardship, the Great Depression had begun (Galbraith, 
1961, pp. 116–117).  
What, if any, lessons can be learned from these events? Furthermore, do these 
hard-earned lessons apply today, after nearly 85 years, in what seems to be a very 
different economy? Intuition unconsciously, yet confidently, answers yes; truths, models, 
and conclusions can both be drawn and applied from the circumstances of the Great 
Crash. Nevertheless, prudence dictates that if interpretations are too broad, then 
practitioners risk misapplying those lessons or neglecting to identify qualifying 
assumptions. Conversely, interpret too narrowly, or dismiss the findings entirely, and the 
prudent theorist may soon find the refrain of history’s ballad playing once again. With 
that disclaimer addressed, the first and most apparent conclusion is that, at the market 
close on Black Thursday, the price of securities was not based on fundamentals. This is 
made near conclusive by the sudden drops both before Black Thursday and in the days 
after the bankers refused to intervene. If, at least in the short run, security prices reflect 
something other than fundamentals—a benign conclusion that comes as little surprise to 
even the most casual observer of the market today—then, how should the short-run 
investor price securities? Admittedly, this is an almost esoteric question that may be 
satisfied by any number of answers. This thesis will explore one potential answer, 
drawing on a variety of disciplines and fields including information sciences, economics, 
military deception, operations security, capital asset pricing, and contemporary market 
conditions.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In contemporary market conditions, how can short-run investors use information 
operations frameworks to incorporate trading indicators, such as liquidity, in order to 
improve the accuracy of the capital asset pricing model? Additionally, how do 
  4 
contemporary market conditions, specifically dark pools and high-frequency trading, 
affect those indicators and the revisions of the pricing model?  
C. RESEARCH METHODS 
This effort employs a comparative analysis of academic and industry case studies 
involving emerging trading strategies and asset valuations. Initial research methods 
primarily involve secondary research focused on military operations security methods 
and techniques along with corresponding deception approaches. High-frequency/low 
latency trading and automated trading systems research, case studies and the myriad 
published academic papers are examined to determine the role of fragmentation in current 
market conditions. A linkage between the two disciplines is established and a model 
proposed to more accurately measure near instantaneous valuation. Unfortunately, due to 
resource constraints and the absence of reliable datasets, the model is limited to face 
validation and future research may provide validation or rejection as appropriate. Finally, 
the model itself, and the model’s proxy metric, will be used as an example to show 
operations security concerns and how deception techniques can be used to manipulate the 
information landscape available to modern traders and investors.  
D. CAPITAL MARKETS 
1. A Brief History 
It is critical to begin with a common understanding of the nature capital markets 
and their derivative, financial markets. The original purposes of capital markets were, and 
remain today, two-fold: to raise money from investors, and to expand commercial 
enterprise. In turn, investors receive a return on their investment, which is either fixed or 
variable depending on the investment class. Two, and only two, vehicles exist for 
commercial enterprises to raise this capital.  
The first vehicle, and the means with which many are most familiar, are equity 
markets. In equity markets, investors exchange capital (i.e., savings) for equity in a 
particular company. This equity, commonly referred to as stock or shares of a particular 
company, represents a portion of ownership the investor has acquired through the 
exchange (Fama & Miller, 1972, p. 64).  
  5 
Usually this equity grants the investor part ownership of the company, which, in 
turn, entitles that investor to certain rights as an owner. These rights include profit 
sharing, voting for board members, and the approval of bylaws (Fama & Miller, 1972, 
p. 64, 67–68). On a side note, not all share classes are created equal, and today many 
companies are issuing increasingly controversial share class termed non-voting, where 
ownership does not ensure shareholders views, are reflected in company decisions 
(Franks & Mayer, 2006 p. 4). While the rights associated with this equity, as the name 
implies, are considerably more restricted, nevertheless, the value of non-voting equity 
fluctuates up or down as the underlying enterprise expands or contracts.  
The second, less understood, though considerably larger capital market, is the 
debt market (Tang, n.d.). While the purpose is the same, to raise money for commercial 
enterprises, the vehicle used in the debt market is a bond, rather than a stock in the equity 
market. A bondholder, or debt investor, is entitled to different rights than the shareholder 
in the equity market. For one, the bondholder is not entitled to company profits, nor are 
they entitled to vote for board members. Nevertheless, a bondholder’s repayment, plus 
interest, is guaranteed on an established timeline, except in the case of bankruptcy 
restructuring. A shareholder has no such right, and in the event of bankruptcy is typically 
the last to receive any form of compensation (Barrett & Sullivan, 1988, p. 1). Through 
many of the theorems and discussions may apply equally to bond markets, equity markets 
and their derivatives will be the primary focus of this thesis. 
Over time, capital markets have evolved into the more broadly defined financial 
markets. While financial markets encompass stock and bond markets, they also include 
some complex financial derivatives of those investment classes. Today options, leveraged 
positions, mutual funds, exchange traded funds, and future contracts are investment tools 
readily available to investors of all levels. For purposes of this thesis, two distinct types 
of investors are defined. First, there is the individual investor who is commonly referred 
to as a retail investor. The retail investor typically has limited access to capital, fewer 
positions, and less advanced trading resources than the institutional investor (Richter, 
1989, p. 1, 5). Institutional investors typically have more sizeable pools of capital, access 
to a wider assortment of trading tools, and considerably more resources invested in 
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research and capital management. Institutional investors also range in composition. A 
few examples of institutional investors today include large corporations, pension plans, 
mutual funds, private equity and hedge firms. Increasingly, institutional investors are 
conducting more of the trades in both the capital markets and global financial markets. 
While retail or individual investors owned an estimated 90% of the stock market in the 
1950s, that number has eroded in every decade since, to about 60% in the aftermath of 
the crash of 1987 (Richter, 1989, p. 5). This decline is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Individual Investors’ Share of Stock Ownership (from Richter, 1989, p. 5) 
In fact, the decline of individual ownership has only hastened since the late 1980s 
to less than an estimated 30% in 2009 (Evans, 2009, p. 1105). Beyond ownership, 
individual investors account for only about 2% of the daily trading on the New York 
Stock Exchange (Evans, 2009, p. 1105). This is in stark contrast to the 20% of daily 
trading attributed to them less than two decades prior (Richter, 1989). Conversely, over 
the past 60 years, large institutional investors have risen as retail investment has fallen, in 
both equity ownership and daily trading.  
In addition to the rising trends toward institutional ownership and trading, two 
other inescapable modern facets of the market landscape are high-frequency trading, 
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(HFT) and alternative trading systems (ATS). HFT is intrinsically linked with another 
practice, algorithmic trading (AT) (Zhang, 2010, p. 5).  While digital implementation of 
these practices is not required in principle, in reality, HFT could not exist without the 
computing power provided by the information age. While experts disagree on what 
exactly defines HFT, in general HFT involves algorithm based buying and selling in 
rapid succession (Gehm, 2010, p. 58). Additionally, HFT firms carry few positions over 
night, closing nearly all trades before the market closes, claiming their added liquidity 
adds a net value to the marketplace that would not be afforded in their absence (Zhang, 
2010, pp. 1–2).  
Furthermore, while algorithm based trading is not a new concept and has been 
employed at various levels since the 1980s, the rise in market share of daily trading 
volumes of HFT in the past decade have been staggering (Richter, 1989, p. D1) Daily 
trading volume statistics on this meteoric rise are shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2.  High-Frequency Trading Daily Trading Volume Market Share 
(from Gehm, 2010, p. 59) 
In 2009, HFT daily trading accounted for more than 60% of the overall daily 
trading volume. That is, on average in 2009, 60% of stock market trades were decided not 
by fund managers or financial advisors, but by computer algorithms acting on their behalf 
(Gehm, 2010, pp. 58–60). 
In addition to the changes in how trades are occurring (i.e., fast and via computer 
algorithms), dramatic changes are happening in where, electronically, the exchanges are 
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taking place. Alternative trading systems (ATS) are “venues or mechanisms containing 
anonymous non-displayed trading liquidity, available for execution” (Banks, 2010, p. 3). 
As a consequence of the anonymous, non-displayed liquidity characteristics, ATSs have 
come to be commonly referred to as dark pools. Though ominous sounding, in reality 
dark pools are similar to their lit counterparts, but offer some distinct advantages that 
have contributed to their rapid growth in popularity. Since regulation and introduction in 
1998, daily trades in dark pools have grown to an estimated 20% over the overall market 
(Banks, 2010, pp. 6–8). Some of the advantages offered by dark pools, over conventional 
lit exchanges, include confidentiality, reduction in market impact, cost savings, and profit 
opportunities/price improvement. These advantages and their links to the information 
operations disciplines of operations security as well as deception will be further explored 
in following chapters. 
2. Lit Exchange Standard Operating Procedures 
Before the advantages of ATSs are addressed, it is important to first provide some 
background, review the lit exchange protocols, common order types and order execution 
rules for comparison purposes. Of the dozens of orders types accepted across various 
exchanges, most are derivatives of two distinct types, market or limit orders. In general, 
market orders specify the quantity and the security that the buyer wishes to purchase, 
while limit orders also specify maximum (minimum) the buyer (sell) is willing to pay 
(accept) for the security. If the limit order bid (offer) the buyer (seller) is willing to pay 
(accept) is lower (higher) than the current market rate, then that limit order is added to the 
limit order book, LOB, on either the bidding or offering side depending on whether it is a 
buy or sell order, respectively (Kane, Liu, & Nguyen, 2011, p. 64). Because the limit 
order is not necessarily immediately executed, as is the case with market orders, the limit 
order adds liquidity to the market, and as a corollary, the limit buyer/seller is a liquidity 
supplier. Conversely, because a market buy (sell) order is executed immediately at the 
lowest (highest) available price listed in the LOB, the market order removes liquidity 
from the market and the market buyer/seller is a liquidity taker (Pascual & Veredas, 
2009, p. 527). While it varies by exchange, typically liquidity takers are charged a fee for 
the removal of liquidity, while liquidity suppliers are offered a rebate for adding liquidity. 
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The fee is usually larger than the rebate, and the difference is collected by the exchange 
to cover operating expenses (Banks, 2010, pp. 94–95). Other types of orders exist. For 
instance, the NYSE has 27 different orders, each with its own characteristics, but most 
are derivatives of the basic market and limit orders discussed (Euronext, 2013). 
The LOB then becomes two simple tables of limit orders, one buy side table, and 
one sell side table. Although it varies by exchange, the minimum information required for 
each row in the table is a unique order identifier (identifying both the order and the 
trading institution or broker who placed the order), quoted price, order quantity, quantity 
traded, and order type. Usually more information is provided such as how much, if any, 
of the order has been partially filled, along with the date and time of order was entered or 
removed, or whether the order was pre-maturely canceled before execution (Kozhan & 
Salmon, 2010, p. 6). The quoted price on the buy side table is referred to as the bid price, 
while on the sell side it is referred to as the offer price (Kane, Liu, & Nguyen, 2011, pp. 
64–65).  A simplified LOB is shown in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3.  Sample Simplified Limit Order Book at Time t  
Although each exchange has slightly different execution rules, generally limit 
orders are executed in their entirety, in accordance with both quote price, and in the order 
in which they arrive. For example, if an additional sell limit order arrived at t+1 in the 
sample, Figure 3, with a unique ID of 3245322, order quantity of 300 at an offer price of 
$10.02, then order 296618 would need to have the 200 shared filled before order 3245322 
could begin execution (Kane, Liu, & Nguyen, 2011, p. 64).  
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Of course, this discussion on limit orders is only half of the equation. Without 
corresponding market orders, few trades would be executed and price discovery would 
likely be hindered. Market orders, unlike most limit orders, are immediately executed, so 
long as sufficient liquidity exists on the opposing side of the limit order book. Continuing 
the example in Figure 3, a market buy order at t+1 of 500 shares would be executed, 
filled against order 182411, 128920 would be partially filled against order 237997 - 300 
for 182411, 100 for 128920, and the remaining 100 for 237997, leaving 600 unfilled for 
237997 with the market order executed completely.  
As a final caveat on limit orders, there is no requirement that buy limit order bids 
be submitted below the last traded price, or sell limit order offers above. In fact, many 
limit orders bids are submitted above the last traded price and sell orders below, 
effectively acting as market orders with guaranteed execution prices given a sufficient 
level of liquidity. These orders are generically referred to as marketable limit orders and 
act more similar to market orders than limit orders with respect to information leakage 
and order flow (Biasis & Weill, 2009, p. 3).   
3. Dark Pools Operating Procedures 
While dark pools operate with the same basic mechanisms as their lit 
counterparts, the largest and defining difference is the amount of information available to 
the participating traders. For example, while the dark pool operators invariably keep and 
execute orders in accordance with a LOB, the contents of the LOB is considered 
proprietary and not released to the public or participating traders. Additionally, the 
execution rules that dictate which orders are executed and in what order are also 
considered proprietary. This has led many to refer to dark pool algorithms dictating 
which orders are filled, and in what order, as a “black box”, observing orders entering the 
box, with filled—or unfilled as the case may be—exit the other side. The implications of 
this black box approach to trading are considerable. Many of these implications are 
discussed in followed chapters and literature reviews.     
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4. The Exchange-Scape and Order Flow in the Ether   
Further complicating the matter is the fact that the two exchanges discussed above, lit 
exchanges and dark pools, are the order fillers of last resort. Many orders never reach either 
exchange and are filled by “internalizers”. In many ways these internalizers resemble dark 
pools with black box algorithms and limited proprietary transactional data, such as hidden 
LOBs with none of the transparencies required by regulated lit exchanges. Figures 4 and 5, 
from two industry publications show notional lifecycles of orders. The Norges Bank 
Investment Management (NBIM), the asset management group of the Norwegian central 
bank, produced Figure 4, while Figure 5 is taken from the Tabb Group’s written statement to 
Congress discussed in detail in the literature review. Tabb goes on to detail the seven-step 
process each order could possibly take, should they remain unfilled prior to reaching the final 
exchange with the national best bid offer (NBBO).  
(1) Broker trades against the order. 
(2) Trade the order in the broker’s internal ATS. 
(3)  Soliciting other clients to trade against the order. 
(4) Send the order to other internal brokers’ ATSs 
(5) Have other brokers solicit orders. 
(6) Send that order to a public exchange.  
(7) If the exchange can’t match the order at the best price, the exchange is 
mandated to route that order to the exchange displaying the NBBO (Tabb, 
2012, p. 3). 
 
Figure 4.  The Order Lifecycle  (from NBIM, 2013, p. 3) 
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Figure 5.  Equity Retail Order Flow Schematic (from Tabb, 2012, p. 3) 
The trade is considered legal and in accordance with the Regulation National 
Market Systems (Reg NMS) so long as final execution is at or better than the NBBO 
price (Tabb, 2012, p. 3). The NBBO price is a result of the Reg NMS of 2007, which 
stipulated that all investors must have equal access to prices, and that trades must be 
executed at the best price nationwide (Banks, 2010, p. 10). Additionally, and to preclude 
any confusion moving forward, the term ask is used interchangeably with offer, and is 
synonymously defined as, the price at which a seller is willing to sell a given security.    
5. A Return to Investor Value 
While fascinating and nuanced, the question of what price an investor should be 
willing to pay for a fixed amount of equity in a given enterprise remains unaddressed. 
William Sharpe’s 1964 work on capital asset pricing offers a viable starting point on how 
to measure such value. Much of Sharpe’s theory on the appropriate price for capital 
assets (i.e., equity) rotates around the notion of risk. Generically, risk is defined as the 
degree of variability in consequence. For example, on a risk spectrum, if no variability in 
outcome exists, then the level of risk is zero; while if variability is infinite, then risk is 
infinite. Sharpe postulates that because portfolio theory has substantiated the claim that 
idiosyncratic or unique risk can be diversified away, the market will only compensate the 
investor for systematic or market risk. A more complete view and nuanced discussion of 
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Sharpe’s work, along with his critics, will be explored in the chapter dedicated to a 
review of relevant literature. In Chapter III, this thesis will propose a modified CAPM, 
based on a change in current market interest vis-à-vis the broader market. The current 
state of the LOB will be used as both a simple-proxy and weighted proxy for both 
idiosyncratic and system-wide market interest. The model will target the volatility 
component of CAPM, β. The newly proposed β’ attempts to increase CAPM valuation 
accuracy by integrating the product of a proxy for short-term volatility and the classic 
historical regression calculated as the covariance of the underlying security over the 
variance of the broader market. Volatility is targeted for refinement for two reasons: first, 
long term historical regression as a model for future volatility has been found to be a poor 
predictor when taken in isolation, and second current market conditions, namely HFTs 
and ATSs have been found to be a contributing factor toward volatility (Zhang, 2010, pp. 
2–3, 7). Chapter IV offers a discussion on the complications anticipated by real world 
implementations of the model, the appropriateness of the proxy, obstacles presented by 
dark pools and internalizers. Finally, Chapter V ties information operations’ paradigms to 
financial decision as well as pricing algorithms, proposes policy considerations, future 
work recommendations, and concludes. 
E. DISCLAIMER 
Of note, while the aims of this research are not strategic, many of the concepts 
discussed may have strategic applications in global equity markets. In the aftermath of 
the 2008 financial crisis, it is clear that if national power can exert pressure on the fiscal 
sustainability of a threat, such exertion may be sufficient to achieve national goals. Some 
of the tactics, techniques, and procedures discussed herein may be applicable, on a larger 
scale, to the exertion of national power. Nevertheless, that is neither the intent nor the 
motivation behind this thesis. All of the research for this thesis is academic in nature. 
Discussions of deception techniques for financial gain are speculative, and should not be 
interpreted as an endorsement of such techniques for use by the U.S. government, the 
Naval Postgraduate School, or the author.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Reading furnishes the mind only with materials of knowledge; it is 
thinking that makes what we read ours. 
—Philosopher John Locke (1632–1704) 
 
A. OVERVIEW 
Surprisingly little research has been conducted demonstrating overlaps from the 
fields of study in information operations, financial markets, and appropriate capital asset 
evaluation. While this dearth of research is unanticipated, it offers an opportunity to bring 
a unique perspective to the discourse and contribute to the academic understanding and 
development of each field. Writing from each field of study is independently explored, 
and academic disciplines of each are reviewed in depth, to ensure a variety of 
perspectives and analysis. The capital asset pricing model serves as the foundation of the 
thesis. It is explored not only in its original form, but also in modified forms from a 
selection of academic critics and theorists. Current market shift and conditions, not 
present when the original model was proposed, are then reviewed in sections dedicated to 
high-frequency trading and alternative trading systems. Finally, information operation 
concepts, on which will be drawn in later chapters, including communication theory, 
operations security, and military deception are reviewed and their historical development 
chronicled.    
B. CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL AND ITS CRITICS 
This equity market literature review concentrates on William F. Sharpe’s (1964) 
capital assets pricing model  (CAPM) and critics of CAPMs limitations over the past 40 
years. Sharpe’s CAPM was one of the first models to quantify the trade-offs between risk 
and return of underlying capital assets, be they stocks, bonds, real estate, or coin 
collections. Sharpe postulates that idiosyncratic risk, or unique risk, of individual 
investments should not be considered a factor when calculating the appropriate return for 
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a capital asset, a consequence of modern portfolio theory (MPT), which is addressed in 
due course. Sharpe’s CAPM is defined such that 
 E[ri ]= rf + βi (E[rm ]− rf )   (1)  
where E[ri] is the appropriate return on asset i, rf is the risk-free rate of return (i.e., 
commonly defined as treasury bills or other stable government issued securities),  βi is the 
ratio of the volatility of the asset and the overall volatility of the broader market, and 
E[rm] is the expected return of the broader market. Broken down into components 
• E[ri] = risk-free return + risk premium of asset i 
• Risk premium of asset i  =βi (E[rm ]− rf )    
As previously mentioned, Sharpe only considered systematic (broader market) 
risk a factor because, through adequate diversification, an investor can reduce the specific 
unique risk of each asset to zero, as demonstrated in Markowitz’s (1952) Nobel Prize 
winning work on MPT, 12 years earlier. Sharpe believes the market would compensate 
only for the expected volatility of the underlying asset. This volatility is measured above 
by Sharpe as βi, a ratio of the volatility of the asset and the overall volatility of the 






  (2) 
Because the broader market is only a theoretical measurement, for specific 
calculations a broader index of equities is often used when calculating β, such as the S&P 
500 (Sharpe, 1964, pp. 428–431).       
While many still consider Sharpe and Markowitz’s seminal work to be acceptable 
models for evaluating expected returns on individual assets, others, over the past four 
decades, have proposed variations on Sharpe’s model and underlying assumptions.  
Banz (1981) demonstrates a correlation between returns and market capitalization 
of underlying equities. Banz stipulates that while this correlation may be a result of a yet-
unidentified third variable, the returns were shown to be independent of the risk class of 
the assets. This previously unidentified factor in returns was just the first in a series of 
critical looks at the fundamentals of CAPM.  
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More than a decade after Banz’s original work, Fama and French (1992) proposed 
incorporating three factors into the estimate individual returns, as compared to the returns 
of the broader market. The Fama and French model integrates Sharpe’s CAPM, referred 
to as the SLB model (Sharpe 1964, Lintner 1965, Black 1972), as well as Banz’s work, 
demonstrating that equity returns also correlate with the market capitalization of the 
underlying asset compared to the broader market. The final factor included in the Fama 
and French model is the relative value of the individual asset. Fama and French measure 
the relative value of the asset using the book-to-market ratio. Fama and French 
demonstrate that firms with higher relative book-to-market ratios can outperform the 
broader market. They also demonstrate that by incorporating all three factors appropriate 
returns are most accurately predicted.       
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) conclude that CAPM could be improved if 
estimated returns consider the liquidity of the underlying asset. Moreover, Acharya and 
Pedersen’s liquidity-adjusted CAPM consider the underlying asset’s liquidity as well as 
the liquidity of the broader market. Additionally, Acharya and Pedersen identify three 
scenarios of liquidity risk: (1) commonality in liquidity with the market liquidity (i.e., 
both market and asset are illiquid); (2) return sensitivity to market liquidity (i.e., investors 
demonstrate a preference for high return securities when the broader market is illiquid); 
and (3) liquidity sensitivity to market returns (i.e., investors will pay a premium for liquid 
stocks when the broader market returns are low) (Acharya & Pedersen, 2005, p. 376). 
Acharya and Pedersen conclude that, in scenario one, the required return of an individual 
security increases as the gap between the securities liquidity and the broader markets 
liquidity increases. Under scenario two, Acharya and Pedersen show that investors will 
move toward high return securities (dividend yielding equities) when the broader market 
is illiquid. Finally, Acharya and Pedersen establish in scenario three, the premium for 
liquid stocks decreases as the broader market returns are decreased (2005, p. 405).  
Originally put forth in 2003, and then revised in 2007, Estrada postulates that β, 
as a measure of risk, may be inappropriate and inaccurate for a variety of reasons. Estrada 
argues that β, as calculated by Sharpe and Markowitz, is only an appropriate measure of 
risk when the distributions of the underlying returns are both symmetric (i.e., up days are 
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likely to be “as up” as down days are likely to be “as down”), and normally distributed. 
Estrada questions whether these assumptions hold for empirical evidence and puts forth 
his own alternative approach to measure risk through an alternative definition of β. While 
Sharpe’s β measurement relies on the variance between the underlying assets and the 
broader market, Estrada believes a better measurement would be to rely on the semi-
variance between the asset and the market, a slightly modification of β, he deems 
downside β. Without getting into the specifics of Estrada’s modified downside β, he 
believes a reliance on semi-variance will address and mitigate the flaws in Sharpe’s β, 
namely the assumption of symmetrical and normal distribution of returns. To test his 
hypothesis, Estrada examines both developed markets (DM) and emerging markets (EM) 
together and then independently. In his commingled analysis, Estrada finds that his 
downside β explains more of the variations in commingled returns than the original β, 
69% versus 54%. In his independent DM analysis, Estrada finds that although the 
downside β better explains variations in returns (8%), neither Sharpe’s original β, nor his 
proposed downside β explains a statistically significant amount of variation in returns. 
Conversely, in EMs, Estrada finds that the downside β explains 55% of the mean 
variation in the returns examined. Estrada goes on to explain much of the variation 
between the original β and downside β displayed in EMs can be credited to a less normal 
distribution among emerging market returns (2007, pp. 179–181). As a final conclusion, 
although Estrada’s downside β is more accurate in both DMs and EMs, he recommends 
the original β calculation for DMs due to its ease of calculation and similar result in 
normally distributed returns. With respect to EMs, Estrada concludes the downside β 
calculation can go further to explain individual asset and market returns due to their more 
erratic and unsymmetrical, non-normal returns (2007, p. 183).    
The relatively recent Dual β theory proposed by Chong, Pfeiffer, and Phillips 
(2010) in the Journal of Personal Finance tests the hypothesis that CAPM accuracy 
could be improved by calculating two historical βi, one for broader market up days, and 
one for broader market down days. The Dual β model defines βi in much the same way 
that Sharpe defines the original βi, except that variation is segregated based on the up or 
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down nature of the broader market on the particular day examined. Therefore the Dual β 
adjusted CAPM is defined such that      




-, and 훽 j
- are the estimated parameters for up-market and down-market 
days respectively; 푟m+ = 푟m on days the market index did not decline and 푟m- = 푟m on days 
it did; D is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 when the market index daily 
return is non-negative, and zero otherwise” (Chong, Pfeiffer, & Phillips, 2010, p. 73). 
Chong, Pfeiffer, and Phillips conclude that using only the down-market day β provides a 
statistically significant improvement over Sharpe’s original β, without considerable 
difficulties in calculation. Nevertheless, the authors also concede that using both the up-
days β and down-days β offer a marginal addition of accuracy, and that the cost in 
additional computation may negate the added benefit over the single down-day β (2010, 
p. 83).   
Roodposhti and Amirhosseini (2010) of Islamic Azad University examined 70 
firms listed on the Tehran stock exchange in order to determine whether there was a 
correlation between a firm’s returns and three macroeconomic variables; interest rates, 
exchange rates and inflation rates. While Roodposhti and Amirhosseini ultimately reject 
all three hypotheses, because they found no correlation between the return of individual 
firms and larger macroeconomic variables, they did proposed and accept an alternate 
CAPM, referred to as Revised-CAPM or R-CAPM defined as 
 Kj = RF + β R(RM − RF )   (4)  
where  
 β R = (DEL)(DFL)(DOL)β oj   (5) 
and  
• β R  is the revised β o . 
• β o  is the original CAPM defined β . 
• DOL (Degree of Operational Leverage) is a measure of the unique 
operational risk calculated as a ratio of the firm’s change in earnings 
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before interest and corporate taxes relative to the larger market index’s 
change in earnings before interest and taxes. 
• DFL (Degree of Financial Leverage) is a measure of the unique financial 
risk calculated as a ratio of the firm’s change in earnings after interest and 
corporate taxes relative to the larger market index’s change in earning 
after interest and taxes. 
• DEL (Degree of Economic Leverage) is a measure of the unique economic 
risk calculated as “a percentage change in the firm’s sales resulting from a 
percentage changes attribute to an exogenous disturbance” in the broader 
economy (Roodposhti and Amirhosseini, 2010, p. 5).  
• For more specific details on the calculations of DOL, DEL, and DFL see 
Roodposhti and Amirhosseini’s published findings in the Journal of 
Finance and Accountancy.   
When compared against Sharpe’s original CAPM, Estrada’s Downside-Adjusted 
CAPM (2007), and Acharya and Pedersen’s Liquidity Adjusted CAPM (2004), the R-
CAPM are all found to be better predictors of the actual returns of individual assets. By 
incorporating not only systematic risk, but also unique or unsystematic risk both before 
taxes and interest (DOL), after taxes and interest (DFL), and the firm’s relative exposure 
to broader economic disturbances (DEL), Roodposhti and Amirhosseini (2010) 
demonstrate that a narrow view of market compensation for systemic risk alone, while 
rational, may not tell the whole story.  
Much of the discussion involved in this research will revolve around the difficult 
assumption that the actors involved in price discovery are rational and have perfect 
information. Many works of past research examine and evaluate the suitability of these 
assumptions, including Robert Merton’s (1987) article “A Simple Model of Capital 
Market Equilibrium with Incomplete Information”. Although at the cusp of the 
information age, Merton postulates that information digestion into capital asset pricing is 
not instantaneous, but rather requires time for the investor to evaluate whether the 
potential gains of acting on the new information outweigh the potential costs of changing 
strategies. A quarter century later, while many of these cost/benefit analyses are executed 
algorithmically through HFT machines, the original proposal, that some amount of time 
exists between information received and information acted, however shortening, still 
holds true. Additionally, Merton infers that market capitalization can be used as a proxy 
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for perfect information as larger companies attract more investors, relative and nominal, 
than smaller firms. Furthermore, those firms with a large number of investors will garner 
more market scrutiny from the media, governmental regulatory agencies, and rating 
agencies. This increased scrutiny is the reason that Merton believes the firm’s value can 
be used as a proxy for relatively perfect information; the larger the firm the more perfect 
investor knowledge will be relative to the size of the broader market. Merton uses this 
proxy in his model for firm returns; postulating that investment returns will increase with 
systematic risk, unique (firm-specific risk) and relative market value (information proxy). 
The last piece of relevant prior work on capital asset pricing is from Berrada and 
Hugonnier (2012) titled “Incomplete Information, Idiosyncratic Volatility and Stock 
Returns.” Like Merton, Berrada and Hugonnier also challenge the view that systematic 
risk should be the only determinant in return calculations. Berrada and Hugonnier argue 
that idiosyncratic volatility must contribute to the individual returns of assets. Using a 
dataset of 2800 firms, Berrada and Hugonnier use “forecast errors” as a proxy for 
idiosyncratic volatility, concluding that, in fact, “incomplete information explains a 
significant part of the relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns” 
(Berrada and Hugonnier, 2012, p. 460).  
C. HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Although high-frequency trading (HFT) and algorithmic trading (AT) are separate 
disciplines and activities, significant overlap exists in their implementation. If HFT is a 
description of the speed at which order decisions are made and executed, then AT is a set 
of rules governing those decisions (Gehm, 2010, pp. 58–60). Due to the 
interdependencies between their implementation, much of modern research data sets and 
analyses consider both trading tools together, because separating the two practices is 
difficult, if not impossible. Significant academic research has recently been conducted as 
a consequence of the impressive growth of HFT/AT across global financial markets. 
Much of this research has been difficult to conduct because of both the vast amount of 
storage required to analyze HFT data, and the proprietary nature of data itself. For 
example, data storage estimates for quotes and trades from 2011 are more than 750 times 
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larger than from 1993, and more than 15 times larger than 2004 (Nexa Technologies, 
2012). 
Champions of HFT growth often claim it reduces volatility and aides in price 
discovery, both which are universally accepted as positive contributions to healthy 
financial markets. Zhang (2010) of Yale University’s School of Management examines 
these claims and others in his published work, “The Effect of High-Frequency Trading on 
Stock Volatility and Price Discovery”. To test these hypothesizes, Zhang runs statistical 
models on historical databases provided by Thomson Reuters of individual firms trading 
above $1 per share from 1985–2009 (11). Zhang breaks out the data into institutional 
investors, individual (retail) investors, and HFT firms to calculate total stock turnover on 
a quarterly basis 
 TO = VOLTOTALSHROUT =
VOLINST +VOLIND +VOLHFT
SHROUT   (6) 







  (7) 
 TO = TOINST *HLDINST +TOIND *HLDIND +VOLHFT   (8) 
where TOX is stock turnover contributed by market participant X, VOLX is the quarterly 
volume traded of X market participant, SHROUT is the total number of outstanding 
shares,  and HLDX is the number of shares held by market participant X during the 
quarter (14). Using regression, while controlling for the underlying business 
fundamentals and macroeconomic volatility, Zhang finds that, in fact, HFT is positively 
correlated with volatility. Additionally, HFT hinders markets ability to price in both 
positive and negative news, leading to overreactions on both up and down days. As a 
final note, Zhang fortuitously finds that while HFT does contribute significantly to 
liquidity levels, he find the contributions on a daily basis “excessive” at nearly 78% of all 
executed orders (2010, p. 33). 
Also in 2010, Smith finds that HFT from 2002-2009 has significantly contributed 
to levels of “Gaussian noise” in the broader market as a result of the 2005 Regulation 
National Market Systems (Reg NMS) reforms that permit the expansive growth of HFT 
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Wall Street firms. These revisions, specifically Rule 611, required that automatic trades 
be executed only at the national best bid offer, with no regard for reliability or transaction 
speed of the counter-party (Smith, 2010, p. 3). Furthermore, Smith finds the SEC’s 
decision to eliminate decimalization, the listing of stock prices in 10¢ increments, also 
contributes to the rise of arbitrage pricing, as firms could chase smaller bid-ask spreads 
(Smith, 2010, p. 3).  Smith finds that, with the introduction of these two changes, and 
using Hurst exponent calculations on 14 different publically traded companies (e.g., aapl, 
gild, bac), Gaussian white noise has increased from a long term average of H = .5 to well 
above H > .6 in recent years (Smith, 2010, p. 12). Finally, Smith concludes that while his 
analysis is of a limited time scale, and that the liquidity benefits of HFT may outweigh 
his findings of increased volatility, HFT firms are having a measurable impact on the 
microstructure and trading dynamics in the markets they operate (Smith, 2010, p. 13). 
Tabb, of the research and strategic capital advisory firm TABB Group, has made 
significant contributions to the understanding and awareness of both HFT and ATS 
effects on the broader market. TABB Group’s Director of Research, Sussman’s prepared 
and oral testimony before the Senate SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITIES, INSURANCE, 
AND INVESTMENT in 2009, as well as Tabb’s personal testimony before the same 
subcommittee three years later, provide a useful industry perspective on the wide array of 
costs and benefits of HFT. When speaking to the issue of cancelation rates (i.e., the 
percentage of orders that are canceled before they are executed either by the order 
originator and the order’s own internal expiration), Tabb believed the rate was around 30-
40% for the broader market, and 96% for HFT firms. More simply put, according to 
Tabb, 96% of all HFT orders placed go unexecuted. For additional perspective, it will be 
helpful to reiterate that, according to Zhang, of all executed orders, 78% originate from 
HFT firms, meaning that just 4% of HFT orders represent 78% of the total market traded. 
The body of this research relies on many of the statements and convictions of Sussman’s, 
Tabb’s, and the other witnesses’ oral and written testimonials from these two 
congressional hearings.  
In 2012, Baron, Brogaard, and Kirilenko of Princeton, University of Washington, 
and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), respectively, examine the 
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profitability of HFT firms to determine whether operating margins justify the explosive 
growth of such firms. Using non-anonymized transactional data gathered from August 
2010 to August 2012, Baron et al. conclude that HFT firms are highly profitable, 
especially those firms acting as liquidity takers and not market makers. Furthermore, 
most HFT profits are accumulated in the short to medium run (seconds to minutes). 
Additionally, adding HFT firms on the aggregate does not reduce the profitability of 
individual firms. This is likely because those additional firms underperform in relative 
terms and exit the market quickly (2012, p. 3). Finally, Baron et al. demonstrated that, 
while quite profitable on the average, $45,267 per day, the risk is considerable with a 
standard deviation of $167,411 per day, almost four times the average (2012, p. 15). 
Nevertheless, even with the sizeable standard deviation, Baron et al. models the 
probability of default to be a rounding error away from zero, where P(default) < .0001 
and the probability of doubling of initial capital after one year is 69.0% (2012, p. 16). 
Finally, and least surprising, the authors find a significant negative correlation between 
latency and profit (2012, p. 34). 
Originally published in 2010 and revised in 2013, Menkveld examines HFT 
firm’s sensitivity to the cost of capital and the effects of other market frictions on 
performance in his work, “High Frequency Trading and the New Market Makers”. 
Drawing on one year of anonymized trading data from a European low fee, low latency 
exchange Chi-X, Menkveld first broke down HFT orders as either liquidity producers, 
that is those orders that were not executed immediately, but waited for an appropriate 
bid/ask, or liquidity consumers, those orders that were executed immediately (2013, p. 8). 
Menkveld observed a relatively low cancellation-to-trade ratio of approximately 5, with a 
fee or rebate only imposed on executed orders (2013, p. 9). Using statistical analysis, 
Menkveld identified a particular HFT firm and determined the firm placed on average 
1,397 trades per stock per day and is more active on equities with larger than smaller 
market capitalization (1,582 versus 315, on average). Finally, Menkveld finds that HFT 
firms are particularly sensitive to market fee structures thusly gravitating toward 
exchanges with the lowest costs and associated latencies, valuing speed as well as 
reduced friction over volume and liquidity (2013, p. 30).   
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Kishore (2012) of the Wharton School examined the success of a specific trading 
strategy commonly known as trading pairs in which a trader “takes opposing long and 
short positions in two assets when the difference their prices hits a certain opening 
threshold” (2012, p. 1). The strategy relies on the underlying assumption that the two 
assets trade together over the long run and exploits a temporary mispricing in the market 
until a correction brings the assets back in line with each other’s valuation (2012, p. 2). 
Using tick-by-tick quote data on XOM and CVX, Kishore determined that trading pairs 
strategy is not useful to HFT because corrections do not occur frequently enough on an 
intra-day basis. Intra-day corrections are required in large part because HFT firms make 
every effort to close out all positions each trading day, without holding any positions 
overnight (2012, p. 12). Additionally, like Menkveld, Kishore found that HFT profits are 
highly sensitive to market friction, namely transaction fees. For example, Kishore found 
that “imposing transaction cost of 5bp and 15bp decreased returns by 11% and 25%, 
respectively” (2012, p. 13).  
Perhaps most appropriate for this research, Ki (2011) of the University of Kansas 
analyzed whether the Capital Asset Pricing Model could be considered effective under 
current market conditions dominated by HFT activities, in “The CAPM and the High 
Frequency Trading; Will CAPM Hold Good Under the Impact of High-Frequency 
Trading?” Using monthly closing prices in 27 different equities over a 20-year period, Ki 
broke down his dataset into three periods of market evolution: before HFT 1994-2000, 
after HFT’s introduction 2001-2005, and after HFT’s deregulation 2005-2010. Ki 
concludes that both the original unconditional CAPM and modern conditional CAPM’s, 
previously reviewed, cannot generate accurate results. Moreover, inaccuracies in results 
have only grown since HFT deregulation in 2005 (2011, p. 14). Ki does not offer his own 
modifications to CAPM for a more accurate model under current HFT market conditions, 
but does advocate for the development of a “good representation for HFT in the capital 
asset pricing model to regain its power to predict the expected return” (2011, p. 14).     
Although not directly related to high-frequency trading, Kubis and Cicarelli’s 
(2012) examination of leading economic indicators as a tool of anticipating turning points 
in business cycles offers some useful insights. Although focused on macro-level 
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economics, Kubis and Cicarelli evaluated 11 widely accepted economic indicators (e.g., 
jobless claims, building permits, money supply, consumer sentiment, etc.) to determine 
whether each could, with any degree of accuracy, predict future economic conditions in 
the broader economy (2012, p. 5). As expected, with the exception of money supply, 
none of the individual indicators had a probability greater than .5 or 50% of accurately 
forecasting recessions (2012, p. 8). Furthermore, over the 20-year period analyzed, more 
than 120 times indictors signaled false positives, either an expanding economy, when in 
reality a recession was on the horizon, or vice versa (2012, p. 8). Although Kubis and 
Cicarelli found sufficient evidence to demonstrate indicators were able to predict peak 
economic environments with some regularity, they conclude that predicting the future 
remains an “innately difficult task” (2012, p. 8).         
D. ALTERNATIVE TRADING SYSTEMS 
Just as academic literature on high-frequency trading is both sparse and recent, so 
too is much of what has been written on alternative trading systems (ATS) commonly 
referred to as dark pools. Started in 1998 as a response to the growing concern that large 
institutional investors were being taken advantage of in the open market, dark pools 
represent an increasing share of trading activity (Young, Pettifer, & Fournier, 2009, p. 
30). Author Erik Banks (2010) studies dark pools extensively in his authoritative text, 
Dark Pools: The Structure and Future of Off-Exchange Trading and Liquidity. Banks 
estimates that approximately 10% to 15% of all U.S. equity trading is conducted in dark 
pools, with some months, depending on market liquidity and volatility, running as high as 
20% (2010, p. 6). These estimates, published only three years ago, are most likely 
considerably higher today, as dark pools trading has being growing at estimates of up to 
40%, annualized (Mittal, 2008, p. 20). Thus dark pools represent a sizeable portion of 
U.S. equity trading and, as such, merit discussion on their historical origins, rise to 
prominence, and useful functions moving forward.  
Markham and Harty (2008) offer a colorful history of the rise of U.S. exchanges, 
focusing on the rise of computerized trading systems known as electronic communication 
networks (ECN), an alternative to the bellowing trading floor of brokers, market makers, 
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and investors of the early 20th century. Of special importance for this discussion was the 
intermarket trading system (ITS) implement by the SEC. The ITS created an electronic 
link between exchanges listing the same equity. In 1981, the ITS and the SEC 
implemented the “trade through” rule that required market makers on other exchanges to 
only execute trades at the best available price, which would come to be known as the 
national best bid offer (NBBO) (Markham & Harty, 2010, p. 878–879). Nevertheless, just 
requiring exchanges to be electronically connected and offer the NBBO, does not explain 
the need for, or rise of dark pools. For that, first it will be necessary to examine the role 
of institutional investors, iceberg orders, and gamers. 
There exists a pervasive believe among large institutional investors that large 
market orders to buy (sell) shares publically will place increase pressure on underlying 
equity and the share price will rise (fall) as a result of just the public disclosure of interest 
by the institution (Banks, 2010, p. 6). An early solution to the problem institutional 
investors faced is the iceberg order. While a derivative of the limit order, the iceberg 
order only displays the peak of the iceberg to the open exchange. For instance, if an 
institutional buyer A wants to purchase 10,000 shares of ABC Corp at a limit of $5.00 
and places an iceberg order divided into 50 tranches, only one 200 share limit order at 
$5.00 (the peak) would be visible on the open order book. Once that peak is filled, taken 
out of liquidity, the new peak would appear on the open order book for 200 shares at 
$5.00. This continues until the entire order is filled, the order is canceled, or the order 
expires. Esser and Monch (2005) examine iceberg orders to determine the optimal limit 
price and optimal peak size for a required probability of complete order execution. Of 
note, Esser and Monch see an inherent tradeoff between peak size and time priority, as 
many exchanges force each additional tranche to the “back of the line” for a given limit 
price (2005, p. 3). In the example above, even if a retail investor B places a separate limit 
order for 100 shares of ABC Corp at $5.00, after institutional investor A places her order, 
B will move ahead of A once the first peak of A is executed. This simplified example 
shows the time tradeoff with peak size that Esser and Monch discuss. The larger the peak, 
the faster the entire order is executed. For their calculations, Esser and Monch used the 
order book data from 61 trading days on a German automated trading System, XETRA 
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(2005, pp. 8–10). Although not necessarily relevant to their conclusions or the 
establishment of iceberg orders, XETRA is an anonymous exchange, displaying limit 
orders, but not market participant identifiers. As seen in Figure 6, Esser and Monch find 
that a full 293 of out the 786 (nearly 40%) of examined icebergs were divided into 10 
equal parts before being openly displayed as limit orders. Seemingly more a consequence 
of our base 10 numerical education that rational examination of the optimal peak size, the 
second most common divisor without surprise is five (Esser and Monch, 2005, p. 10).  
 
Figure 6.  Ratio of Initial Order Volume to Peak Size of All Different Iceberg Sell 
Orders in the Sample (from Esser & Monch, 2005, p.10). 
Also of interest, are findings that showed less than 18% of all iceberg orders 
examined were executed in full and a majority (52%) were not executed at all, partially or 
completely (Esser and Monch, 2005, p. 11). Esser and Monch consider order size, limit 
price, time before expiration, and probability of order completion when determining the 
optimal peak size. Throughout many their computations, some variables are held constant 
so as to graphically demonstrate the relationships and trade-offs. Figure 7 shows one 
step-function of these relationships, optimal peak (φp), for a given total order size (φ0). 
This example is selected to contrast to the prior market finding preference for 
 ϕ0 = 10*ϕ p   (9) 
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Figure 7.  Optimal Peak Size φp as a Step Function of φ0 (Other parameters: P∗ = 25%, T 
= 100 hours) with Equation 9 Imposed (after Esser & Monch, 2005, p. 30). 
Esser and Monch conclude that their modeled optimal peak sizes are considerably 
larger than the observed market data, as demonstrated in Figure 7. Additionally, the 
authors believe two reasons may aid in explaining this disparity. First, they concede that 
their model may underestimate the negative price-impact that information leakage could 
have on large institutional investors by displaying large limit orders on the open book. 
Secondly, and without significantly more insight, the authors offer that it could be the 
market that is over-estimating the negative price-impact on information leakage (Esser 
and Monch, 2005, p. 27). 
One facet of what makes dark pools efficient lies in the anonymity they provide 
and what, if any, this trait has on liquidity and volatility? These questions and others 
related to anonymity are examined by Foucault, Moinas, and Theissen (2007) in a 
throughout examination of the natural experiment created by the French Stock Exchange, 
Euronext. Foucault et al. analyze Euronext market data from both before and after 
Euronext switched from open identities to anonymous quotes in April, 2001 to confirm 
their hypothesis that average quoted spreads are smaller in anonymous markets. This 
finding suggests to Foucault et al. that an open limit order book is a source of volatility 
resulting from information asymmetry (Foucault, Moinas, & Theissen, 2007, pp. 1708–
1709). Unlike much of the research conducted on anonymity, Foucault et al.’s study 
focuses on liquidity suppliers, (i.e., pre-trade limit orders anonymity) versa liquidity 
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takers (i.e., pre-trade block market order anonymity). While research shows that 
concealing identities of liquidity takers exacerbates the reduction of overall liquidity 
(Seppi, 1990), Foucault et al. show that concealing identities of liquidity suppliers 
improves overall liquidity. Much of Foucault et al.’s model rest on information 
asymmetry between informed and uninformed limit orders about pending information 
events (2007, pp. 1710-1711). The authors propose a model to quantify the final value of 
a security  !V  at time 2,  !V 2, such that 
  
!V2 =V0 + !I * !ε1   (10) 
where V0 is the value of security V at time 0;  !I is equal to 1 if the information event 
occurs, otherwise 0; and  !ε1  is equal to 
+σ if the information event has a positive event on 
security V, or –σ if the information event has a negative price effect (2007, pp. 1711–
1712). Foucault et al. ultimately forecast their model against the natural experiment listed 
above to determine what effect, if any, adding anonymity has on future volatility of bid-
ask spreads and by extension market liquidity. The authors’ findings include smaller bid-
ask spreads post anonymity introduction, implying unsurprisingly that informed traders 
are more inclined to expose their information advantage in an anonymous environment, 
consequently leading to more market liquidity. Additionally, Foucault et al.’s findings 
support the notion that asymmetrical information contributed to volatility and that limit 
order books contain such information beyond that which is publically available.  
(Foucault, Moinas, & Theissen, 2007, p. 1740).     
Anand and Weaver (2004) examine a similar natural experiment when in 1996 the 
Toronto Stock Exchange first prohibited hidden orders, only to reintroduce them 8 years 
later in 2002 (2004, p. 405). While similar, this dataset has some differences, namely that 
while only identities where hidden for Foucault et al., Anand and Weaver’s hidden details 
where comprehensive, (i.e., ID, price, volume, etc.) until the limit orders were executed. 
After reviewing 272 Canadian stocks traded over the time periods described, Anand and 
Weaver conclude, surprisingly, that market liquidity is not reduced by the removal of 
anonymity from the system. Anand and Weaver make this conclusion while admitting 
those traders that would have placed hidden limit orders (liquidity suppliers) instead 
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placed market orders (liquidity takers) (Anand & Weaver, 2004, p. 425). While 
unchanged volume is not surprising, Anand and Weaver do not address the unresolved 
discrepancy that an increase in liquidity takers does not result in a decrease to overall 
liquidity. Additionally, while this switch (limit to market) allows traders in effect to hide 
their order, Anand and Weaver do not evaluate the price impact or adverse selection this 
change has on those traders. Lastly, Anand and Weaver reinforce their view that 
regulators seeking to increase liquidity, as many do, should not expect that mandated 
order exposure will result in additional limit orders (liquidity suppliers) and, in turn, 
liquidity, but rather, traders will use market order mechanisms to implement strategies 
(Anand & Weaver, 2004, p. 425). 
Winne and D’Hondt (2007) model hidden orders in order to discern why traders 
use such tactics and what risks are avoided by so doing. Using a public dataset from 
Euronext of 40 large capitalization stocks from a three month period, Winne and 
D’Hondt show that traders employ hidden orders to overcome two visible limit order 
risks: exposure and pick off (2007, p. 5). Exposure risk, as previously discussed, is the 
risk that a visible limit order may adversely affect the price by exposing the trader’s 
motives. Specifically, Winne and D’Hondt hypothesize that, while order size is a factor 
for traders in determining whether to employ hidden orders, relative liquidity will provide 
a better determinant for the trader’s decision. Specifically, “traders are more likely to 
hide part of their limit orders when the prevailing displayed depth is small relative to 
their order size” (Winne & D’Hondt, 2007, p. 7). The second danger, pick off risk, is the 
chance of a second trader undercutting the visible limit order within the existing bid-ask 
spread. Furthermore, Winne and D’Hondt hypothesize that proof of traders trying to 
mitigate this risk is shown by more hidden buy (sell) orders when the buy (sell) side of 
the limit book is heavier, i.e., more bids (asks). Specifically, “buyers (sellers) are more 
likely to hide part of their limit orders when the visible ask (bid) depth is larger than the 
visible bid (ask) depth” (Winne & D’Hondt, 2007, p. 7). When Winne and D’Hondt 
present and model their data, both theories are accepted. Furthermore, the authors find 
that not only are the above market conditions predictors in hidden orders a likelihood, but 
the presence of hidden orders themselves also affect trader behavior, and that focusing 
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solely on displayed market information without hidden inference may result in 
misleading or incorrect conclusions (Winne & D’Hondt, 2007, p. 13).     
Ganchev, Nevmyvaka, Kearns, and Vaughan (2010) examine the appropriate 
allocation of large orders over multiple competing dark pools. While dark pools are 
designed to handle large institutional orders, placing too large an order can have a 
negative price impact for the buyer and can run the risk of removing all liquidity of a 
particular pool (Ganchev, Nevmyvaka, Kearns, and Vaughan, 2010, pp. 99–100). 
Ganchev et al.’s uncharacteristically comprehensive dataset includes both submissions 
and executed orders from four dark pools: BIDS Trading, Automated Trading Desk, D.E. 
Shaw, and NYFIX with individual order sizes ranging from 100 to 50,000 shares. 
Ganchev et al.’s conclude that their proposed learning algorithm for determining how 
many dark pools to target is more effective than targeting a single pool (2010, p. 106). 
Also, while examining their dataset, Ganchev et al. discover that a full 84% of submitted 
orders go entirely unexecuted with neither partial nor complete order fills (2010, p. 104).   
Now discussing ATS, Tabb (2008) categorizes dark pools based on inherent 
characteristics of their design. According to Tabb, “ownership, matching frequency, price 
formulation, access, and liquidity indicators” are natural segmentations of dark pools 
(Tabb, 2008, p. 1). Ownership, the most straightforward of the classifications, is broken 
down into four categories: independent, exchange-owned, broker-owned, and 
consortium-owned. While Tabb briefly discusses matching frequency, he quickly 
dismisses it as “less critical [in recent years]” (Tabb, 2008, p. 1). Conversely, a solid 
understanding of the pricing formulation techniques of individual dark pools is critical to 
order success, as pricing algorithms can differ significantly from one pool to another. 
According to Tabb, dark pools “do not have equal or fair access—not everyone can play 
and not everyone is equal” (Tabb, 2008, p. 1). Understanding where the lines are drawn 
on access defines the target population and the sophistication of that population. Tabb’s 
final segmentation, liquidity, is a vital component of dark pools. Without liquidity, dark 
pools lose viability as a trading alternative to public exchanges. According to Tabb, to 
facilitate this liquidity some “algorithmic providers are increasingly using liquidity alerts 
or indicators of interest (IOI) to notify liquidity providers of a trading opportunity” 
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(Tabb, 2008, p. 1). Tabb goes on to point out that these IOI’s run counter to the original 
intent of dark pools, namely to provide liquidity for large trades without information 
leakage (Tabb, 2008 p. 1). Four years later, in Tabb’s (2012) written testimony to the 
House Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Tabb clarifies his prior 
comments on segmentation challenges when he writes, “ATSs do not need to publish 
their matching rules, order types, or even their volumes, in fact, ATS anonymity is 
protected by SEC under Reg ATS, so there isn’t a single consolidated list of ATSs and 
the SEC will only provide the information under a Freedom of Information Act filing” 
(Tabb, 2012, p. 10). 
E. INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
While information operations (IO) is a relatively new military discipline by name, 
in many ways as old as warfare itself by characteristic and definitions. With its present-
day origins in the electronic warfare community of the late 1980s, information warfare, 
now information operations, doctrine has been through many reorganizations and 
repositioning over the past three decades. Before the current iteration IO was organized 
under five pillars: 1) psychological operations; 2) military deception; 3) operations 
security; 4) electronic warfare; and 5) computer network operations (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2006, p. I-1). Nevertheless, joint doctrine has recently, yet again, refined the scope and 
principles associated with IO. Currently accepted, though increasingly nebulous, doctrine 
defines IO as is “the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-
related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, 
or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting 
our own” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012, p. vii). The new Joint Publication, 3-13, continues 
to incorporation both operations security and military deception as two critical 
information related capabilities (IRCs). These two IRCs, along with their tenants, 
principles, and components will serve as substantial elements in this research (Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2012, p. II-6). 
A comprehensive review of information operations literature and research more 
broadly will be of considerable value, before operations security and deception academic 
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and practitioner literature is considered. First off, a quick note on the distinction between 
information warfare and information operations may explain one particular element of 
nuance in the discussion. According to many academics and practitioners information 
warfare, notably absent from Joint Publications since 2006, is the application of 
information operations during a time of conflict or crisis. This is largely a consequence of 
the broader understanding that information warfare contains an element of coercion and 
inherent hostility to achieve specific objectives (Allen, 2007, p. 5). With this distinction 
in mind, and given the area of study in this research, information operations will be the 
focus of review and analysis over information warfare, although both are considered and 
each for their own merit.       
The most overwhelming facet of IO is the blend of complexity, coupled with the 
expansive definitions integral to the successful employment of the art and science of 
information operations planning. From the electromagnetic spectrum, to influence 
operations rooted in the human psyche, operating in the information domain represents an 
enormous challenge to military commanders even with a nuanced understanding of 
today’s information landscape. Allen, author and project manager with General 
Dynamics Advance Information System, writes in his 2007 textbook on IO planning, “the 
IO planning space is much larger than the tradition military planning space … both in 
terms of the types of desired effects … and in terms of the number of capabilities 
potentially available” (Allen, 2007, p. 38).  
In agreement with Allen is Armistead, editor of Information Operations: Warfare 
and the Hard Reality of Soft Power when he writes, “a common complaint about IO is 
that because its definition is so broad, IO is at once everything and it is nothing” 
(Armistead, 2004, p. 19). Armistead goes on to draw attention to a list of IO related 
capabilities that would be considered to be quaint by today’s standards in regard to size 
and scope, including CA, CAN, deception, destruction, EW, OPSEC, PA, and PSYOPs 
(Armistead, 2004, p. 20). From there Armistead continues to examine IO from an 
organizational perspective, identifying roles and responsibilities across U.S. government 
agencies and departments. While critical to understanding how the U.S. conducts 
information operations, this organizational perspective of IO offers little marginal value 
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to this research and the theoretical conduct of IO in the U.S. or global financial landscape 
(Armistead, 2004, pp. 25–63, 163–166). Furthermore, a large part of Armistead’s 
research focuses on computer network operations (CNO), both in the attack (CNA) and in 
the defense (CND) (Armistead, 2004, pp. 65–89, 111–122). This is a recurring theme in 
IO related publications. Many times one facet or element of IO dominates the research, 
such that other capabilities are neglected, not out of carelessness, but out of necessity, lest 
the publications grow unwieldy in scope, weight, and undertaking. This again highlights 
the need for simple paradigms and analogies when discussing a topic as broad as 
integrating more than 20 different military and non-military capabilities (Department of 
Defense, 2013, pp. 41–44). 
One such model published in 1998 by Waltz of Environmental Research Institute 
of Michigan (ERIM) International shows the information processes involved in conflict 
between two sides and is shown in Figure 8. This model is of particular value because it 
does not rely on any one information related capability while tracing the actions of one 
party through the physical domain, to the enemy’s perception, will, and ultimately 
actions. This action is the proverbial forest of which some IO researchers and academics 
lose sight, while focusing on the individual aspects of particular information related 
capabilities.       
 
Figure 8.  Waltz’s Basic Model of Information Process in Conflict 
 (from Waltz, 1998, p. 6) 
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Also of note is Waltz’s elegant description of information theory first addressed 
by Shannon in 1991. In Shannon’s model an inverse relationship exists between the value 
of a piece of information and the probability that the particular piece of information is 
true or has occurred. Waltz’s gives the example of a battlefield sensor where the most 
valuable information (i.e., nuclear weapons’ deployment, enemy surrender, etc.) is also 
the least likely and the least valuable information (i.e., truck movement, satisfactory 
readiness level reports, etc.) are the most likely to occur frequently (Waltz, 1998, p. 58). 
Shannon’s model is shown such that M = (x1, x2, x3, … xn) and is defined as a set of all 
possible “messages” from the system X that can exist in any one of n states. Shannon 
derives the value of information as a measurement of the information entropy, a metric of 
disorder or uncertainty. Therefore, the higher the entropy of the information, the more 
valuable the underlying information is reasoned to be (Waltz, 1998, p. 60). With this in 
mind Shannon defines the entropy to be H:   
 H = Pi log2 Pi
i=1
n
∑   (11) 
where H is the entropy; Pi is the probability that the information is in the ith state; and n is 
the number of possible states in which the information could exist. Log2 puts the 
entropy’s units in base 2 or bits (Waltz, 1998, p. 60). From this model, Waltz draws three 
useful and essential conclusions. First, if there is only one possible message that can be 
reported by the system, X (i.e., n =1), then the entropy of the information is 0, H = 0. 
This also means that the information is of no value, which is of course true as the 
outcome was predictable and self-determined. Second, if the probability of all messages 
is the same (i.e., p1=p2=p3=…pn), then the entropy of the system is non-zero and 
increases as n increases. Finally, if the probability of each message is not the same, then 
the entropy of the information will decrease as the variance in probabilities increase until 
the extreme example of the first inference is reached and the entropy is 0 (Waltz, 1998, p. 
60). This model is shown in Figure 9.  
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Figure 9.  Entropy Measurement of Information (from Waltz, 1998, p. 61)   
While many of the general information operations’ models and theories discussed 
previously are drawn upon in follow-on chapters, before new materials are presented, a 
thorough discussion of operations security and deception will be of significant value.  
F. OPERATIONS SECURITY: IDENTIFYING AND KEEPING SECRETS 
The purpose of operations security or OPSEC as defined in Joint Publication, JP, 
3-13.3 is “to reduce the vulnerability of US, coalition, and combined forces from 
successful adversary exploitation of critical information” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006, I-
2). Furthermore the JP defines the OPSEC process in three steps:  
1)  Identify those actions that may be observed by adversary 
intelligence systems. 
2)  Determine what specific indications could be collected, analyzed, 
and interpreted to derive critical information in time to be useful to 
adversaries. The commander must know the model or profile of his or her 
organization. 
3)  Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to the 
visibility of joint forces to observation and exploitation. (Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2006, p. I-2) 
Aside from joint publications and other doctrinal sources, surprisingly little 
academic material concerning operations security has been published. Nevertheless, from 
corporate espionage to computer security models, a considerable amount of research has 
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been conducted around the periphery of OPSEC. These topics and others are examined 
herein to offer additional background on the matter of military information leakage and 
how it relates to the forthcoming discussion on financial information leakage. 
The best known security model, and the one most militaries model their own 
information classification schemes on, including the U.S., is the Bell and LaPadula model 
of 1973. Originally published for the MITRE Corporation, the elegant Bell and LaPadula 
model defines two entity types and two simple rules. The first entity, a piece of data, 
always has a level of classification (i.e., unclassified, confidential, secret, or top secret) 
for which the data is associated. The classification level is a consequence of how 
damaging the information contained in the data would be if released (Ferson, 2004, p. 
23). The second entity, a subject, always has a clearance level (i.e., unclassified, 
confidential, etc.) for which the subject is permitted to read and write new data. The two 
simple rules, which, when followed, would ensure classified data was not compromised 
are 1) A subject may only read at his/her classification level or lower and 2) A subject 
may only write at his/her classification level or higher. Nevertheless, while keeping the 
information secure one unfortunate side effect is communication difficulties to subjects 
down the classification ladder (Ferson, 2004, pp. 23–24). This considerable misgiving 
means that ultimately the utopian implementation of the Bell and LaPadula model is 
unfortunately untenable.  
Another disadvantage of the Bell and LaPadula model is the lack of attention the 
model gives to the integrity of the underlying data. Specifically, the model de facto 
encourages lower level cleared subjects to write to higher clearance levels. This neglected 
integrity is of great concern, because just as a loss of confidentiality, the focus of Bell and 
LaPadula model, poor integrity control measures can also have devastating consequences 
for decision makers and analysts. The Clark and Wilson model offers some relief over the 
Bell and LaPadula model by adding a third entity over subjects and objects called 
transformation procedures or TPs (Ferson, 2004, p. 24). These TPs act on behalf of the 
user, restricting the subject from directly creating or modifying the underlying data. 
Additionally, these TPs flag any changes or additions the subjects make to the data as 
“unconstrained data items.” An independent third party must review these “unconstrained 
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data items” before they can be converted into “constrained data items.” The integrity of 
the data is then maintained, as the “constrained data items” are verified before re-
integration with the larger dataset (Ferson, 2004, p. 24). Also important to note, the 
original Clark and Wilson model offers some confidentiality controls in addition to the 
integrity measures above. The TPs can also act as authentication systems, barring users 
from interacting (i.e., reading, writing, or executing) with datasets without appropriate 
clearance levels (Ferson, 2004, p. 25).  
Outside of doctrine and academic models for safeguarding integrity and 
confidentiality, many operations security practitioners, both military and civilian, have 
examined real-world features and characteristics of OPSEC. One such practitioner, LtCol 
Michnowicz of the U.S. Army War College, Strategic Research Project, examines the 
roles of protecting information, specifically confidentiality, in his 2006 paper entitled, 
OPSEC in the Information Age. Michnowicz succinctly describes OPSEC as “the attempt 
to prevent information leakage that [could be used] to derive intelligence from 
information” (Michnowicz, 2006, p. 2). Beyond the classification systems described 
above, Michnowicz finds that according to al Qaeda training manuals, near 80% of “their 
required information about US forces could be obtained from open [unclassified] source 
material” (Michnowicz, 2006, p. 5). Michnowicz’s understandably concludes “the 
information age brings with it increased capabilities in … telecommunications and the 
Internet with world wide access,” and that unless the DoD “can manage its internal 
information properly, adversaries can effectively glean intent, capabilities, and 
vulnerabilities [emphasis added]” (Michnowicz, 2006, p. 8). 
Although Michnowicz’s and, in general, OPSEC primary concern lies with the 
piecing together publically available information gaining a competitive advantage, also of 
concerns is the active gathering of private information, known as espionage. An annual 
report produced by the DoD’s Defense Security Services compiles and analyses defense 
industry reports of foreign espionage. While taken in full the report is fascinating, for the 
purposes of this research, how the espionage is conducted is of more value than where or 
on what targets. Of specific note, the 2013 report finds 657 cases of foreign espionage 
conducted mostly by commercial enterprises, 34%, through what they refer to as 
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suspicious network activity (SNA). SNA replaced the 2012 most common method of 
operation (MO), attempted acquisition of technology (AAT), and request for information 
(RFI) (Defense Security Service, 2013, p. 6). Shockingly, this means that up until the 
most recent reporting period the most common technique for gathering sensitive or 
classified information, according to DSS, was simply to ask for it. Characterized by cyber 
intrusions, viruses, worms, spear phishing, along with other malware, SNA has risen 
considerably faster than any other MO in the past 12 months, rising globally 19% with a 
staggering 240% rise in the “East Asia and the Pacific” region alone (Defense Security 
Service, 2013, pp. 11, 25–26). Figure 10 shows the top five MOs from both FY11 and 
FY12 for comparison purposes.  
       
Figure 10.  Top 5 Methods of Operations for Foreign Espionage 
(from Defense Security Service, 2013, p. 26) 
Allen, of GD AIS, proposes a more comprehensive seven-step process to 
operations security. Allen’s OPSEC process parallels his military deception planning 
steps, outlined in later chapters. Allen elegantly concludes his steps when he writes, “The 
execution of the OSPEC plan does not have to be perfect; it just has to have fewer leaks 
than the features of the deception plan accepted by the enemy” (Allen, 2007, p. 144).  
1) Select a COA using the joint operation planning process (JOPP) 
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2) Establish which characteristics of the selected COA differ from the 
corollary deception plan and would cause damage if exposed to enemy 
intelligence collections. 
3) Outline the signatures and indicators of the operations plan that are to 
be kept hidden from enemy collections. 
4) Outline the tactics, techniques, and procedures enemy intelligence 
collectors will use to detect the outlined signatures and indicators. 
Specifically what sensors will enemy intelligence gathers employ for their 
collection efforts. 
5) Establish metrics for determining if enemy detection efforts are 
successful in targeting the outlined signatures and indicators.  
6) During the conduct of operations confirm via friendly intelligence 
channels whether enemy sensors have detected the established signatures 
and indicators, and furthermore, whether intelligence analysts and 
decision-makers have accepted those collections as true. 
7) Finally, compare the results of Step 6 to the results of the military 
deception plan to determine if the OPSEC plan was as or more effective at 
hiding signatures and indicators than the MILDEC plan was at portraying 
false signatures and indicators. (Allen, 2007, pp. 143–144)  
This seven-step, and the three-step, OPSEC process outlined in the Joint 
Publication will offer considerable value in the context of leaking financial information to 
opportunistic third-parties. Of particular interest is how signatures and indicators factor 
into trading strategies and investment decisions. Furthermore, how can the BLP and CW 
models be implemented in financial market mechanisms to prevent information leakage 
and, barring prevention, successfully detect the leakage has occurred? While not 
exhaustive, this comprehensive review of academic, industry, and government literature 
on operations security, and other information guarding activities, provides a solid 
baseline from which to discuss information leakage in a financial context. Nevertheless, 
before this discussion it will be of significant value to examine the topic of military 
deception and its role in both the financial and military information landscape.     
G. DECEPTION: APPEARING WHERE YOU ARE NOT 
There is no shortage of academic and practitioner writings on military deception, 
colloquially referred to as MILDEC. First, it will be useful, however, to first examine the 
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broader academic topic of deception before delving into the differences between inter-
personal, political, and military deception.  
Bell and Whaley’s published work, Cheating and Deception, traces the origins 
and evolution of contemporary academic work concerning deception from Plutarch of 
ancient Greece, to Machiavelli of Renaissance Italy. Bell and Whaley found the 
philosophers in agreement that “the question is one of brute force versus disassembling, 
cunning, guile, fraud, in short, force versus deception” (Bell & Whaley, 1982, pp. 3–4, 
36–37). Later the authors add a caveat to this conclusion when they write, “[deception] 
need not even be the weapon of the weak … It can be, rather, a means toward an end not 
easily achieved by brute force” (Bell & Whaley, 1982, p. 9). Bell & Whaley propose the 
most succinct of definitions when they advocate that deception is “advantageous 
distortion of perceived reality” (Bell & Whaley, 1982, p. 47).  The authors organize 
deception into two broad categories, both derived from natural occurring deception found 
in the environment. Those broad categories, showing and hiding, provide a framework 
for examining deception. Bell and Whaley define three subcategories in each, with 
showing’s components of mimicking, inventing, and decoying, and hiding’s component of 
masking, repackaging, and dazzling (Bell & Whaley, 1982, pp. 48–61). Later in the text, 
the authors depict and describe a proposed planning loop for deception.  
  
Figure 11.  The Bell & Whaley Deception Planning Loop 
(from Bell & Whaley, 1982, p. 71) 
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Shown in Figure 11, the Bell and Whaley deception planning loop is a multi-step 
process to successful deception. The loop begins with a selected channel, to deliver an 
intended illusion, to achieve an intended stratagem, to contribute to a deception goal, and 
ultimately accomplish a strategic goal. After the ruse is composed and projected, the 
success of the plan is out of the hands of the deception practitioner and into the perceived 
reality of the intended victim (Bell & Whaley, 1982, pp. 71–74). 
One authoritative text, required for any comprehensive review of Military 
Deception is the 1981 compilation of papers included in the book, Strategic Military 
Deception, edited by Daniel and Herbig. Originally commissioned by the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s Office of Research and Development in 1978, this collection 
brings a wide range of academic perspectives to the discipline of military deception 
including two political scientists, an historian, a physicist, a psychologist, and an 
electrical engineer (Daniel & Herbig, 1981, p. xi). While each author conducts the 
majority of their research and findings independently of the group, a wide range of views 
helps the reader appreciate the spectrum of inquiry, from the psychologist’s qualitative 
perspectives on analyst bias, to the electrical engineer’s system’s approach to deception. 
The joint introduction concisely defines deception as “the deliberate misrepresentation of 
reality done to gain a competitive advantage” (Daniel & Herbig, 1981, p. 3). A close 
derivative of Bell and Whaley, the Daniel and Herbig definition includes many of the 
same elements such as the non-arbitrary origination and the deceiver’s purpose to gain an 
advantage over the deceived. The authors also identify three goals of deception: condition 
the target’s belief; influence the target’s actions; and benefit from the target’s actions 
(Daniel & Herbig, 1981, p. 5). Daniel and Herbig’s deception process is shown in Figure 
12. Though similar to Bell and Whaley’s deception planning loop, in the distinct 
deception process the deceiver must transmit multiple signals through multiple channels 
in hope the target will rebuild the “deception puzzle.” Only if the deception puzzle is 
rebuilt by the state intelligence apparatus, forwarded through the decision maker’s 
gatekeeper, and acted upon by the decision maker in a favorable manor is the deception 
ruse considered a success (Daniel & Herbig, 1981, pp. 7–11).     
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Figure 12.  Daniel and Herbig Process of Deception (from Daniel & Herbig, 1981, p. 8) 
Defense technology expert, Reese’s contribution to the strategic deception 
compilation approaches deception from the classic communication’s paradigm depicted 
in Figure 13. Reese begins by simply describing each component of the paradigm and 
how each stage’s output serves as the follow-on stage’s input (Daniel & Herbig, 1981, 
pp. 100-105). Of special note, is Reese’s discussion of signal-to-noise ratios. Originally 
defined in communication theory, the signal-to-noise ratio describes the power output of 
the system over the Gaussian random white noise injected by the nature of the 
encoder/decoder and the selected channel. Nevertheless, Reese astutely observes that the 
phrase “signal-to-noise” in an intelligence setting has been widely used to identify 
relevant indicators of enemy intentions, from either false indicators or indicators of little 
importance. This intelligence adoption of the phrase “signal-to-noise” is therefore 
somewhat inappropriate as the denominator. Noise lacks any element of randomness and 
is not inherent to the encoder/decoder and environment, but rather inherent to the fog of 
intelligence gathering (Daniel & Herbig, 1981, p. 101).  
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Figure 13.  Classic Communication’s Paradigm (from Daniel & Herbig, 1981, p. 99) 
After addressing the classic communication’s paradigm, Reese breaks down the 
message concept illustrated in the classic paradigm into the summation of micro-
messages. These micro-messages or indicators are designed by the deceiver and sent over 
a predetermined channel for reception by the intended victim. As shown in Figure 14, 
each indicator, Ix , must first pass through channel, Cx , before being decoded by the 
receiver into I 'x . According to Reese, the deception plan has its best bid for success if, 
but not only if, the summation of I 'x is a reasonable approximation of the summation of 
the original indicators Ix . Reese asserts that the deception plan may still succeed 
regardless of whether the indicators are decoded incorrectly, as ambiguity-increasing 
deception does not require the deception puzzle advanced by Bell and Whaley (Daniel & 
Herbig, 1981, pp. 109–110).   
 
Figure 14.  Level 1 and 2 Transaction Depiction (from Daniel & Herbig, 1981, p. 110) 
Source Encoder Channel Decoder Destination
Noise
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Electrical engineer and system’s theorist Moose’s contribution to the 
aforementioned anthology, “A System’s View of Deception” (1981) refines Reese’s 
writings of the communication’s paradigm from a system’s perspective. Moose’s model, 
depicted in Figure 15 includes more realistic variables than Reese’s, including 
unintentional leaks, delays in transmission and relays, and human errors throughout. 
Moose also describes a tactic he calls, “probing the channel,” when a deceiver will send 
signals to the victim for the sole intention of gauging the response of the victim. This 
gives the deceiver two advantages. First, it demonstrates the channel is active and the 
victim is decoding messages. Second, it allows the deceiver to better craft future 
messages to elicit the intended response from the victim, now aware of how the victim 
will react to certain stimuli (Daniel & Herbig, 1981, pp. 140–142). One final note on 
Moose’s work is the distinction he draws between static of stable system’s operations and 
dynamic or transitional system’s operations. Moose cautions that stable decision systems 
are more predictable, and, as such, success of deception plans may be more easily 
assessed. Furthermore, transitional systems tend to produce unpredictable outputs that 
may not only have an effect on the success of deception, but will undoubtedly have an 
effect on the detection of said success (Daniel & Herbig, 1981, pp. 142–143).  
   
Figure 15.  Modified Classic Communication’s Paradigm 
 (from Daniel & Herbig, 1981, p. 141) 
At this juncture, it’s imperative to revisit the impressive collection of academic 
work by the late deception philosopher, once Tuft’s University and Naval Postgraduate 
  47 
School professor, Whaley. Whaley’s 1969 MIT dissertation, “Stratagem: Deception and 
Surprise in War,” provides the authoritative text on deception successes and failures from 
1914–1968, categorizing and analyzing more than 165 battles from 16 separate wars 
(Whaley, 1969, p. v). Claiming first analytical approach to military deception, Whaley 
finds that deception is an effective means of aiding strategic surprise in 41 out of 53 cases 
(Whaley, 1969, pp. 3–5). Whaley goes on to define, discuss, and digest the practitioners 
of deception from the West, such as Hitler and Churchill, as well as from the East, such 
as Mao and Giap (Whaley, 1969, p. 6). After this recap, Whaley begins the more practical 
discussion of both strategic and tactical deception such as feints, demonstrations, 
disinformation, and ruses as well as channels such as word-of-mouth, newspapers, radio 
diplomacy, and espionage (Whaley, 1969, pp. 18–23). Much of Whaley’s research is 
most useful in a military context. For instance, Whaley examines the dataset to detect 
patterns in victory rates and casualty rates resulting from surprise and deception. 
Additionally, Whaley examines his dataset to determine under what operations is 
deception most likely employed, such as 40% for land based operations and 85% of 
amphibious operations (Whaley, 1969, pp. 189–223).  
Whaley, like many others, makes the observation that successful deception 
essentially boils down to a question of choice for the victim. Building on the 
philosophical discussions of English military theorist Liddell Hart and American civil 
war general Tecumseh Sherman, Whaley describes the deception plan as aiming to put 
the victim in the “horns of a dilemma and then impale him on the one of your choosing” 
(Whaley, 1969, p. 129). Distinct in Whaley’s discussion is the concept of victim choice. 
According the Whaley, the victim has the illusion of choice, and the deceiver, if 
successful, chooses from the set of alternatives for the victim, aptly put, “the ultimate 
goal of [deception] is to make the enemy quite certain, very decisive, and wrong. 
[emphasis in the original]” (Whaley, 1969, p. 135).      
Also of note is Whaley’s discussion on ethics, which for obvious reasons, may be 
of considerable value to this research. In Chapter III, Whaley asks whether deception in 
warfare is ethical. Whaley finds that while almost universally, “occidental and oriental 
military cultures find [deception] … to be immoral,” in practice “sheer expediency has 
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proven sufficient justification” and with two exceptions, no culture has “unilaterally 
forsworn [deception]”  (Whaley, 1969, p. 100). Whaley argues his two exceptions, the 
Vedic age in India and the Middle Ages in Europe, stem from underlying cultural 
circumstances of the periods, and are most notable for their rarity in history. Additionally, 
these unique examples do suggest that, given an appropriate cultural environment, 
deception has been completely removed from warfare (Whaley, 1969, p. 103). 
Understandably, Whaley’s justification of deception in a military context does not fully 
justify deception used for financial gains. For this reason and others discussed later on, 
the topic of ethical deception in financial matters is left very much open for debate.     
Whaley concludes with three economic maxims he has found true throughout his 
research. First, deception is cheap. Whaley advocates that deception plans require small 
investments in personnel, materials and monies to be effective. As an example, Whaley 
estimates that the entire allied invasion deception plan of 1944 required no more than 
2,000 soldiers and greatly hastened their victory (Whaley, 1969, pp. 232–232).  Second, 
deception presents a solid return on investment. According to Whaley’s research, the 
deceiver surprised the victim 80% of the time when a deception tactic was implemented. 
Given the aforementioned minimal costs, and the overwhelming evidence of resulting 
surprise, Whaley concludes “[deception] is certainly the cheapest and often the most 
effective means of manipulating an opponent’s military economy” (Whaley, 1969, pp. 
233–238).  Finally, while deception and security can be mutually supporting, deception, 
not security is the best guarantor of surprise. Specifically the author views security 
systems, such as operations security, as requiring greater investments in personnel and 
resources than deception, as well as, having a smaller overall chance of success than 
deception. Whaley’s opinion on this matter extends to both strategic and tactical 
operations  (Whaley, 1969, pp. 240-243). Perhaps most surprising of all, in Whaley’s 
summary, he concedes that while it is possible for deception to backfire on the deceiver, 
he has found no historical evidence of such an incident (Whaley, 1969, p. 262). Also of 
note is Whaley’s reiteration of his previous points on the economics of deception in 2007. 
Whaley’s theories on the cost effectiveness of deception are demonstrated with both new 
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and old evidence in the text Information Strategy and Warfare, edited by Arquilla and 
Borer of the Naval Postgraduate School (Arquilla & Borer, 2007, pp. 127–155).   
More than 30 years after his dissertation, Whaley revisits the topic of deception as 
an editor in his self-published compilation, A Reader in Deception and Counterdeception 
(2003). Although many of the articles are reprints from both earlier unpublished and 
published work, Whaley again offers an insightful academic perspective on the value of 
deception in military affairs. For instance, in Whaley’s quantitative research he discovers 
that the “probability of achieving surprise by using two deception ruses is quite high 
(.88), and the probability of achieving surprise given three or more deception ruses is 
[1.0]” (Whaley, 2003, p. 76). Furthermore, once surprise is achieved, through deception 
of security, then the probably of victory associated with that operation is also quite high, 
.87 (Whaley, 2003, p. 76). Whaley cautions the reader, and correctly so, not to 
inappropriately concluded causations from his derived correlated statistics. Although 
Whaley does not identify by name any possible hidden variables that could explain 
causation between deception, surprise, and victory, even the most unimaginative reader 
could propose alternative causation for Whaley’s correlation (Whaley, 2003, p. 76–78).  
Over the course of his 2003 composition, Whaley discusses deception in a 
multitude of settings including games of chance, cheating spouses, magician’s illusions, 
military affairs, politics, and crime solving. Inordinately well versed in these fields, 
Whaley concludes (2003, p. 82) 
I … assert that deception is the same regardless of whatever field it 
appears in. It is not a function of technology. All deceptions are applied 
psychology – the psychology of misperception. Consequently, along 
psychological lines it must be logically possible to develop a general 
theory of deception.  
In a separate Whaley article of the same anthology, the author revisits his 
topology of deception as outlined earlier in his book, Cheating and Deception with co-
author Bell. Though at first mostly semantic, Whaley renames the showing category as 
simulation, and the hiding category as dissimulation (Whaley, 2003, p. 86). Nevertheless, 
later Whaley makes the elegant conclusion that each subcategory in simulation (e.g., 
mimicking, inventing, decoying) has a counterpart or antonym in dissimulation (e.g., 
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masking, repackaging, dazzling). Whaley theorizes that these three pairs of subcategories, 
masking/mimicking, repackaging/inventing, and dazzling/decoying, are most effective 
when used in conjunction. To test his hypothesis, Whaley examines 60 magic tricks to 
see which tactics are used most often, logically inferring that the most often used tactics 
are also the most effective. Whaley goes on to show not only his hypothesis is true, but 
also that certain subcategory pairs are most effective than others, with masking/mimicking 
as the most effective (Whaley, 2003, pp. 87–90).  
 
Figure 16.  Whaley’s Deception Subcategories (from Bennett & Waltz, 2007, p. 26) 
In Whaley’s final work, he discusses military deception successes and failures in 
the work When Deception Fails: The Theory of Outs. Whaley postulates that rarely does 
military deception actually fail, in fact, total failure and total success almost never occur. 
Even implemented poorly, some deception is better than no deception, because of the 
preponderance of evidence that total failure is unlikely (Whaley, 2010, pp. 6–8). 
Nevertheless, Whaley does concede that failure can occur in military deception, and 
when it does, it is a result of one or more of five causes: 1) design failure; 2) initiation 
failure; 3) transmission failure; 4) inept implementation; or 5) target detects the deception 
(Whaley, 2010, p. 7). In addition to these most common errors, Whaley enumerates 14 
lessons learned from his years of research. Although, it is not useful to detail all of his 
learned lessons here, three that may be particular useful for this research and context are 
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1) know the tools of your craft, 2) notify HQ in advance if friendly units may be 
adversely affected, and 3) keep the plan simple, short and flexible (Whaley, 2010, pp. 10-
12). While the application of these principles in the context of this research may not be 
obvious yet, more parallels will be drawn in follow-on chapters.  
In more recent years, a near constant source for Whaley, Greenberg, attempts to 
further quantify the economies and payoffs of deception in his 1982 article “The Role of 
Deception in Decision Theory.” Greenberg begins by laying out a simple two-
dimensional model for decision-making, shown in Figure 17. According to Greenberg, 
the decider must first assess the “State of Nature” (SN), and then choose from a list of 
alternative decisions (AM), in accordance with the greatest payoff (PMN) (Greenberg, 
1982, pp. 141–142).  
 
Figure 17.  Greenberg’s General Decision Problem (from Greenberg, 1982, p. 142)  
Unfortunately, rarely is the state of nature definitive so the decider must consider 
the probability of each state of nature and calculate the expected payoff in accordance 
with that probability. The empirical value of this expected return is shown in Equation 
12. Ei'  is the summation of each payoff (Pij ) from all the possible states of nature (from 
one to j), in the selected alternative row (i) crossed with the probability ( qj ) of that 
particular state of nature (Greenberg, 1982, pp. 141–143).  
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 E 'i = qjPij
j=1
N
∑   (12) 
 When the decider is deceived, the perceived probabilities of each state of nature 
are altered so as to encourage the decider to unknowingly pick a less than optimal 
expected return.  In Figure 18, Greenberg shows an abbreviated example of this approach 
to calculating the cost of deception to the victim. The figure shows the optimal alternative 
for the victim based on the true probabilities of each state of nature to be A2, for a return 
of 2.3. Nevertheless, the deceiver has been successful at manipulating the victim’s 
probability perception into believing A4 is the optimal alternative. As such, the cost to the 
victim is the difference between the highest expected value (2.3) and the chosen expected 
value (1.5) or .8 (Greenberg, 1982, p. 144–145). From the perpetrator’s perspective, a 
more valuable approach, a therefore more costly for the victim, would have been to raise 
the target’s perceived probabilities such that alternative one was selected. This would 
have given the victim the smallest expected value (0) from the list of alternatives. The 
reader is left with only conjecture (e.g., costs, miscalculations, unintended consequences) 
to explain this oversight by the perpetrator.  
  
Figure 18.  Greenberg’s Cost (Value) of Deception to the Victim (Perpetrator) 
(from Greenberg, 1982, p. 144)   
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No discussion on military deception would be complete without at least a brief 
mention of another monolith of the discipline, Handel. Much of Handel’s work focuses 
on the study and exploitation of intelligence; offering analysis on historical case studies 
from the U.S. Civil War to cold war operations, that dominated the second half of the 
21st century. Interestingly, Handel’s definition of deception lacks the competitive 
advantage element so consistent in others work (see Whaley, Daniel, Herbig, etc.). 
Handel defines deception as “the process of influencing the enemy to make decisions 
disadvantageous to himself by supplying or denying information” (Handel, 1987 p. 1). 
Although pure speculation, perhaps implicit in Handel’s definition is the zero-sum game 
of warfare, whereby if the enemy is disadvantaged, then friendly forces are naturally 
advantaged. Handel goes on to mildly endorse the notion that at the root of all deception 
plans is the intent to surprise when he writes “deception per se has no value; it assumes 
significance only when used as a means of achieving surprise [emphasis in the original]” 
(Handel, 1987, p. 2). Today this claim, one worth revisiting, appears, at best, extremely 
limiting for deception planners and, at worst, dangerously naïve for counterdeception 
practitioners. Handel writes extensively about the significance of feedback during 
deception execution. For instance, Handel writes specifically about the role of the Ultra 
program during the Second World War (i.e., a covert signals intelligence program to 
break German cypher codes and monitor German communications), “Ultra was the single 
most important means of facilitating deception available to the Allies … the deceivers 
could rely on Ultra to monitor the degree to which it had been accepted by the Germans, 
then follow this up by fine-tuning continue deception cover plans” (Handel, 1987, p. 22).  
Also of value is Handel’s observation that “an inverse correlation exists between 
strength and the resort to deception” (Handel, 1987, pp. 30-31) This is to say that stronger 
states will shy away from deception plans, as their own hubris reassures them that no 
such plan is necessary, often with devastating consequences. Handel points to the Soviet 
Union’s attack on Finland in 1939, Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, and 
the Arab attack on Israel in 1948, as just three examples where deception was not 
attempted, with demoralizing defeats for the aggressing belligerents (Handel, 1987, p. 
31). Handel concludes this point when he emphatically states, “Although the tendency of 
power states to rely on ‘brute force’ can be understood, it certainly cannot be justified: 
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the strong and powerful need not waste their strength … simply because they are 
confident of victory” (Handel, 1987, p. 41).  These points and others Handel makes 
throughout his collection of works are as useful as they are prolific. While focusing on 
case studies Handel makes many appreciated observations about the role of deception 
throughout history.  
Building on their earlier work, Daniel and Herbig revisit deception in their 1982 
paper, Propositions in Military Deception. Taking cues from two World War II deception 
planners, one allied, one axis, Daniel and Herbig advocate five factors of successful 
deception schemes: 1) secrecy, organization, and coordination; 2) plausibility and 
confirmation; 3) adaptability; 4) predisposition of the target; 5) strategic situation (Daniel 
& Herbig, 1982, p. 167). The authors identify the minimum two levels of secrecy 
required for deception. The first protects the facts and circumstances of the intended 
operations, while the second protects the existence of the deception plan itself (Daniel, 
Daniel & Herbig, 1982, p. 168). The second factor is the plausibility of the deception 
scheme. Though it seems intuitive, at least as recently as WWII, enemy intelligence 
analysts, based solely on the improbable nature of the implied operation, have dismissed 
deception indicators (Daniel & Herbig, 1982, p. 169). Additionally, Daniel and Herbig’s 
axis deception planner, Von Grieffenberg, suggests, “deception is enhanced if the 
deceiver adapts to changing circumstances and unplanned events” (Daniel & Herbig, 
1982, p. 170). Surprisingly, the final two factors, predisposition and strategic situation, 
were not addressed by Daniel and Herbig’s sources, but were added after the fact. While 
admittedly not impossible, changing the victim’s preconceived notions, according to the 
authors, is certainly psychologically more difficult than reinforcing those beliefs (Daniel 
& Herbig, 1982, p. 173). Also of note is the tendency of victims to follow predispositions 
when in an extreme mental state of hyper-vigilance or indifference. Conversely, 
therefore, biases are most easily altered when the victim’s mental state is one of moderate 
tension (Daniel & Herbig, 1982, p. 173). Daniel and Herbig’s final factor deals with the 
initiative advantage the deceiver has over the victim. The authors consider this time 
advantage of the deceiver to be a critical factor in the success of the overall plan. In their 
view, a rushed deception plan will be risky, unadvisable, and ultimately ineffective 
(Daniel & Herbig, 1982, pp. 174–175).         
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Bennett and Waltz’s 2007 text, Counterdeception: Principles and Applications for 
National Security offers a compressive contemporary and historical overview of the 
development of both deception and counterdeception. Modeled after Whaley’s deception 
paradigm, but semantically divergent, the authors separate hiding from showing, or 
simulation from dissimulation, by renaming the breakdown denial and deception 
(Bennett & Waltz, 2007, p. 5). Bennett and Waltz offer a worthwhile illustrative example 
of a generic deception information flow, shown in Figure 19. Beginning with objectives, 
the deception indicators flow from methods, through channels, to targets, and ultimately 
for effects (Bennett & Waltz, 2007, p. 6). 
 
Figure 19.  Bennett and Waltz’s Generic Deception Information Flow 
(from Bennett & Waltz, 2007, p. 6) 
Perhaps most valuable in Bennett and Waltz writings are their four fundamental 
principles of deception, first outlined in Chapter Two: “1) Truth – All deception works 
within the context of what is true; 2) Denials – Denying the target access to the truth is 
the prerequisite to all deception; 3) Deceit – All deception requires deceit; 4) 
Misdirection – Deception depends on manipulating what the target registers” (Bennett & 
Waltz, 2007, p. 59).  While some of these fundamental principles seem more obvious 
than helpful, a few points of nuance will help clarify the discussion. Bennett and Waltz’s 
first principle, on truth, astutely identifies the condition that when no secrets require 
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protecting, then no deception plan is necessary. Furthermore, if the target audience gains 
access to the aforementioned valuable secrets and accepts those secrets as truth, a 
frequently underestimated condition, then the deception plan is also moot. This notion is 
encapsulated in Bennett and Waltz’s second and forth principle. Perhaps most useful is 
Bennett and Waltz’s last principle which, stated differently, is that projection is 
irrelevant, that perception and action is where the focus of deception metrics as well as 
methods must be defined. (Bennett & Waltz, 2007, pp. 58–60)        
Beyond the academics, many practitioners of military deception have matriculated 
through the halls of the Naval Postgraduate School. One such practitioner from the 
Defense Analysis program, Martin, under the tutelage of academic John Arquilla, tackled 
Military Deception in her work, Military Deception Reconsidered. Martin does an 
excellent job recapping the academic theories of military deception from the past fifty 
years and makes many compelling conclusions. Martin began by identifying the two 
commonly accepted types of deception, Misleading (M-Type) and Ambiguity Increasing 
(A-type) (Martin, 2008, p. 11). These two types of deception will play a critical role in 
this research, as each will have a different effect on the decision making environment for 
the actors in involved. Martin goes on to categorize and classify different academic 
theories on what factors contribute to a successful military deception campaign. Martin 
concludes that six different elements recur in most, but not all, literature, as required 
factors for successful deception. These elements include: 1) focus; 2) objective; 
3) centralized control; 4) security; 5) timelines; and 6) integration (Martin, 2008, p. 35). 
Although not all of these factors were present in all the case studies Martin 
examined, most contained four or more characteristics, demonstrating a clear association, 
if not causation, between these factors and the success of the deception (Martin, 2008,  
pp. 21–34). 
A second practitioner of military deception, MacKrell, also wrote on the 
principles involved in successful deception campaigns. Although MacKrell describes the 
same two types of deception, A-type and M-type, she refers to M-type as misdirection 
instead of misleading (MacKrell, 1996, p. 2). While this is again mostly a semantic 
difference between the two academics, it shows that much of the jargon associated with 
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deception and more broadly, information warfare, has still not been solidified nearly two 
and a half millennia after Sun Tzu. Understandably, this reoccurring theme makes clear 
definitions vitally important to conveying complex topic and relationships. Written nearly 
two decades ago, MacKrell believes that an age of “perfect information” would make 
deception exceedingly difficult, but not impossible (MacKrell, 1996, p. 4). Furthermore, 
MacKrell advocates that successful deception campaigns contain four required elements: 
1) reinforcing preconceptions, 2) plausibility, 3) multi-channel deception, and 4) “The 
administrative side: secrecy, control coordination” (MacKrell 1996, pp. 4–16). Many of 
the topics and conclusions in MacKrell’s research are ripe for reexaminations in the age 
of information overload.   
The topics of denial and deception are not unique to military operations or 
disciplines. Though some people may be uncomfortable in applying the paradigms and 
constructs above, especially misinformation campaigns, to financial decisions and 
calculations, to ignore the existence of such constructs already in place is both naïve and 
would fail to adequately address current financial landscapes. To that end, from here the 
research and follow-up discussion revolves around the ideal environment for reevaluating 
the capital asset pricing model. After the revision is presented and dissected, the 
discussion shifts to underlying assumptions and complications presented in real world 
implementation of such calculations. Finally, dark pools and HFT implications are 
addressed as additional obstacles to implementation, while Chapter V concludes and 
offers a number of topics for future work.  
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III. ADJUSTING CAPM, THE MODEL, THE PROXY, AND 
DECEPTION 
Even minutiae should have a place in our collection, for things of a 
seemingly trifling nature, when enjoined with others of a more serious 
cast, may lead to valuable conclusion. 
—President George Washington (1732–1799) 
 
A. LONG-TERM BETA 
The vast majority of the critics of the capital asset pricing model accept many of 
the underlying premises of Sharpe’s argument. Instead these critics, including Acharya 
and Pedersen (2005); Estrada (2007); Chong, Pfeiffer and Phillips  (2010); and 
Roodposhti and Amirhosseini (2012) target the sensitivity index, β, for improvement and 
refinement. While accurately forecasting β has proved difficult, the classic approach is to 
use past results as a proxy to measure and forecast β through historical regression. 
Specifically, the β is forecasted as the slope of the underlying assets historical returns, as 
they relate to the historical returns of the overall market for a given period of time 
(Chong & Phillips, 2011, pp. 68). Nevertheless, even this relatively straight-forward 
calculation can vary greatly depending on assumptions of the estimating statistician, such 
as the “look-back period” or whichever index is selected as the reference benchmark for 
the broader market (Chong & Phillips, 2011, pp. 67).  While standard industry practices 
recommend a minimum of a one-year look-back period and the S&P 500 as the broader 
market for U.S. equities, these estimating parameters do little to estimate the most current 
market conditions; a great concern for high-frequency trading firms and other short-term 
investors who open and close positions quickly and rarely hold sizeable positions 
overnight (Chong & Phillips, 2011, pp. 69).  
This thesis proposes that incorporating short-term sensitivity indicators into β 
forecasting, along with the classic long-term historical correlation between market return 
and asset return, could improve β forecasting resulting in a more accurate prediction for 
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an assets return given an anticipated market return. This slight modification is illustrated 
in equations 13, 14, and 15. Equation 13 is the original CAPM as described in the 
literature review; Equation 14 is the slightly modified CAPM with β'; and Equation 15 
defines β' as the un-weighted average of the historical β for the short-term, current market 
correcting factor, φ. For simplicity, the short-term correcting factor φ is given equal 
weight as the long-term classic proxy, historically regressed β. Nevertheless, it could be 
true that an equal weight is inappropriate and a more accurate β' could be forecasted by 
placing more emphasis on either the short-term correcting factor or the long-term one. 
This possibility and other data-driven areas of recommended research are addressed in 
Chapter V, Conclusion.    
 E[ri ]= rf + βi (E[rm ]− rf )   (13) 
 E
'[ri ]= rf + β 'i (E[rm ]− rf )   (14) 
 β 'i =
ϕi + βi
2   (15) 
B. SHORT-TERM PHI, BETA PRIME, AND THE LOB 
Estimating φ presents many of the same difficult assumptions that accompany 
measuring β, the long-term sensitivity of an asset’s return. Ultimately, historical 
regression was selected as a proxy to estimate future asset returns based on projected 
returns of the broader market. Because φ is defined as a measurement of current to short-
term sensitivity, historical regression is ill-suited, and a more dynamic metric should 
substitute for the short-term sensitivity of an asset. For simplicity of comparison to 
original β, the S&P 500 index will continue to be used as a comparison baseline when 
defining the broader market. As a proxy for short-term sensitivity of an asset to the 
broader market, this research will turn to the information and market interest expressed in 
the limit order book.   
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Figure 20.  Sample Simplified Limit Order Book at Time t 
Although the information contained can vary, the most basic limit order book 
(LOB) contains, at a minimum, unique order identifiers, bid/ask prices, order sizes, and the 
date/time the orders arrived at the exchange. When taken in total, the LOB can offer 
significant insight into the short-term volatility of the underlying asset, offering substantial 
economic value of LOB analysis, such as order depth, order flow, and book balance 
(Kozhan & Salmon, 2010, pp. 2–4). Although these terms are used liberally throughout 
limit order book academic research, a common definition remains elusive in many cases. 
Broadly speaking, order depth refers to the quantitative number of unique price levels 
contained on both the buy and sell side of the order book. For example, Figure 20 shows 
five distinct price levels are present on both the buy and the sell side of the LOB. Less 
quantifiable, though certainly related, is a variation on this definition for market depth, 
defined as the market’s ability to sustain relatively large market orders without impacting 
the price of the security (Banks, 2010, pp. 17, 54). This definition is more versatile than 
merely counting the various price levels because it incorporates all the various price levels, 
as well as the breath of the LOB (i.e., how many shares per order). 
The order flow is commonly defined by the rules and fees that dictate how, and in 
what order, trades execute. Discussed briefly earlier, the fees and rebates associated with 
liquidity takers and suppliers, as well as rules governing first-come-first-fill execution, 
are just some of the elements included in order flow and visible in the LOB.  Finally, the 
book balance is defined as the intensity of the buying liquidity present in relation to the 
intensity of the selling liquidity in the limit order book (Foucault & Menkveld, 2008, p. 
152). More simply put, the balance of the book merely refers to the buy side versus the 
sell side of the limit order book.  
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C. THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE MODEL 
As was discussed previously, in addition to contributing depth, limit orders also 
provide liquidity to the market. Various calculations on book balance and this liquidity 
may provide an excellent proxy for measuring short-term sensitivity, just as historical 
regression serves as the long-term alternative. Before specific calculations are discussed, 
it will be of considerable value to discuss the rationale behind turning to the limit order 
book and the book’s balance as a short-term proxy for sensitivity. Much of the rationale 
is drawn from the logical inference that, when the LOB balance weighs heavily toward 
buying liquidity, then a heavier propensity of price support for the underlying asset would 
follow, as the buying liquidity would more easily absorb market sell orders than the 
selling liquidity could absorb corresponding buy orders (Fong & Liu, 2010). Price 
support refers to a price level, which a stock has difficulty falling below.  Consider 
Figure 21, little imagination is required to accept that, given a moderately equal number 
of market buy/sell orders, the price of the underlying asset would rise, or barring a rise at 
least not fall, due to the lop-sided nature of the LOB (Gomes & Waelbroeck, 2010, pp. 
1099–1100). While not difficult to imagine, this proposition, and the forthcoming 
converse, requires a number of assumptions that have yet to be addressed.  
 
Figure 21.  LOB Weighted Toward Buying Liquidity 
Conversely, when the LOB balance weighs heavily towards selling liquidity, this 
would imply a similarly heavy propensity of price resistance for the underlying asset as 
the selling liquidity would more easily absorb market buy orders and marketable buy 
limit orders than the buying liquidity could absorb corresponding sell orders (Fong & 
Liu, 2010). The opposite side of the previous example is depicted in Figure 22, where 
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given a moderately balanced number of market buy/sell orders, the price of the 
underlying security would fall, or barring a fall, at least not rise, due to the heavily 
weighted sell side of the LOB  (Gomes & Waelbroeck, 2010, p. 1099). 
 
Figure 22.  LOB Weighted Toward Selling Liquidity 
D. DERIVING THE PROXY 
Carrying these two suppositions, that a book weighted toward buy limit orders 
leads to price support and that a book weighted toward sell limit orders leads to price 
resistance, to their logical conclusions suggests that a balanced limit order book, as 
roughly depicted in Figure 20, would likely experience both price support and resistance. 
Put another way, given a few forthcoming assumptions, this balanced limited order book 
would likely lead to a reduction in volatility and a more stable price level of the 
underlying security. Nevertheless, these generalities remain unquantifiable until thorough 
definitions and metrics are established to establish how balanced a LOB is along with the 
weight of each side of the LOB. In order to determine the balance of the overall book, the 
first step is to establish the weight of each side. The most primitive approach to 
measuring this weight is shown in Equation 16 where the weight of each side is simply 
defined as the summations of the orders from the corresponding side, referred to, moving 
forward, as the simple liquidity for its respective side.     
 SL = qi
i=0
n
∑   (16) 
Given the state of the LOB is as depicted in Figure 22, then the simple liquidity of the 
buy side of the LOB would be 400 shares (e.g., 300 shares from 56633 plus 100 shares 
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from 19067). Conversely, the simple liquidity of the sell side of the LOB would be the 
simple sum of quantity of shares at each price point, or 3050 shares.  
However, because the aim is to measure the support or resistance of the current 
price level, this simple liquidity metric could be improved upon to measure not only the 
total quantity of shares ordered per side, but also the distance from the most recent price 
point of the security. Therefore, a more accurate representation of implied support and 
resistance could be estimated by more heavily valuing liquidity near the last traded price 
– which will typically, though not always, be near the midpoint between the highest ask 
and the lowest bid. Just as in the case of simple liquidity, complex liquidity is measured 
for each side and defined in Equation 17 where q is the order quantity, QP is the most 
recent quoted price, and Bid/Ask is the ordered price at each of the various price levels 
from 0 to n.      
 CL = qi|QP − (Bid / Ask)i |i=0
n
∑   (17) 
Continuing the simple example in Figure 22, in this case the complex liquidity of the buy 
side of the LOB would be 18,333.34 (e.g., 300÷.02 + 100÷.03). The lengthier, though 
trivial, computation of the sell side Complex Liquidity is 74,750 and is outline in Figure 
23. Although multiple orders at the same price level have not been collapsed, the unique 
identifiers have been removed for this example for ease of presentation.  
 
 
Figure 23.  LOB with calculated Complex Liquidity   
If the total complex liquidity, TCL, is defined as the sum of the buy side and sell 
side complex liquidity, then these quantitative metrics now allow for easy comparison of 
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book balance by comparing the complex liquidity ratio of each side of the LOB. The buy 
side complex liquidity ratio, BCLR, is defined in Equation 18, with the sell side complex 
liquidity ratio, SCLR, defined in Equation 19 – both equations include example metrics 
from Figure 23. 
 BCLR = BCLTCL =
18333.33
93083.33 = .197   (18) 
   
 SCLR = SCLTCL = 1− BCLR =
74750
93083.33 = .803   (19) 
Immediately apparent is that as the SCLR converges to the BCLR, or vice versa, 
volatility is reduced as the implied support approaches resistance. Additionally, as the 
SCLR diverges from the BCLR volatility, is increased and stability is reduced, as the 
implied support digresses from resistance. Nevertheless, the liquidity ratios alone are an 
insufficient metric in isolation and must be compared relative to the liquidity ratios of the 
broader market. Additionally, and in keeping with the 2003 Dual β proposal of Estrada, it 
will be helpful to approach up market β slightly differently than down market β. 
Specifically, the aforementioned φ will be defined in an up market as the ratio of the buy 
side CLR of the asset to the buy side CLR of the broader market, while in a down market 
φ will be defined as the sell side CLR of the asset to the sell side CLR of the broader 
market.  
Continuing with example in Figure 22, let us assume that the broader market is 
down and has a composite sell side CLR of .75. This composite sell side CLR of the 
broader market is defined as the ratio of the summation of weighted sell liquidity over the 
total liquidity. Just as in the case of the original β, a large basket of equities, such as the 
S&P 500 would be an appropriate proxy for the total market. Therefore in this instance 
(e.g., a down market) φ, or short-term sensitivity, as measured through relative liquidity 
from the LOB, is estimated to be about 1.25 and is shown in equation 20.  
 ϕ = SCLRaSCLRm
= .803.64 = 1.25   (20) 
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Carrying the example to its conclusion, and when a long-term historical β of 1.5 is given, 
then the adjusted β', outlined in Equation 15, is a simple non-weighted average of 1.38, 
ultimately reducing the expected losses in this instance by about 8%. This is in line with 
expectations, as a smaller than anticipated increase in selling liquidity from asset a, in 
relative terms to the selling liquidity of the overall market, would slightly depress the 
downward pressure on the losses of asset a. When instead, a long-term historical β of 1.0 
is given, then the adjusted β', outlined in Equation 15, is a simple non-weighted average 
of 1.13, ultimately increasing the expected losses in this instance by 11%. This is also in 
line with expectations, as a larger than anticipated increase in selling liquidity from asset 
a, in relative terms to the selling liquidity of the overall market would slightly exacerbate 
the downward pressure on the losses of asset a. These findings are also consistent with 
Cao, Hansch, and Wang’s research suggesting that as much as 22% of price discovery 
can be explained based on step increments below and above the best bid and ask listings 
in the limit order book  (Cao, Hansch, & Wang, 2009, p. 18). 
E. THE PROXY OVER TIME 
The LOB depicted in Figures 21, 22, and 23 are snapshots in time and drastic 
changes in the composition of the book, both in terms of liquidity and balance, just before 
and after the snapshot, is both expected and not trivial. As such, the derived β is also 
likely to change, perhaps considerably, over time. This is again, not unexpected, and not 
unlike the classic calculation of historical regression. Just as each day adds another data 
point to determine the long-term sensitivity of the asset to volatility of the broader 
market, running snapshots of the LOB over time are expected to reveal a shorter-run 
sensitivity. Further research in this area is recommended to determine the usefulness of 
tracking “historical” (measured in micro-seconds) short-run sensitivity metrics from the 
LOB for forecasting purposes using models such as weighted moving averages or 
exponential smoothing.      
F. JUSTIFYING ECONOMIC VALUE DERIVED FROM THE LOB     
Using the limit order book information and arithmetic derivations thereof as a 
proxy is a feasible proposition. The New York Stock Exchange began publishing both 
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sides of the book under the OpenBook program in 2002, while the NASDAQ has a more 
restricting policy of only publishing the top five price levels from either side (Kozhan & 
Salmon, 2010, p. 4). Furthermore, many non-public limit order books are accessible by 
industry professionals through internalizers and wholesale broker/dealers. A controversial 
practice, using information from non-public limit order books and internalizing less 
informed retail investors, is known as ‘skimming the cream’, and has been shown to 
reduce the probability of adverse selection for the internalizing institution. Internalizing 
smaller retails orders and forwarding larger institutional order to the broader market 
reduces the probability of adverse selection. Evidence suggests that this reduction in 
adverse selection (i.e., trading with a more informed agent) occurs because smaller orders 
are unlikely to have private information relating to the value of the traded asset. 
Furthermore, this increases the risk of adverse selection on the open exchanges, as a 
larger proportion of informed orders are forwarded and not internalized (Grammig & 
Theissen, 2012, pp. 82–83). Grammig and Theissen find evidence to support the 
hypothesis that internalizers lead to “cream-skimming” and the exploitation of less 
informed retail investors. They also found that the retail investor enjoys a price 
improvement over the institutional investor because regulation requires the internalizers 
to offer securities at, or better, than the best open market bid/offer. Because Grammig and 
Theissen do not measure the economic value of the price improvement for the retail 
investor, in relative terms, to the economic value for the internalizers because of their 
reduced adverse selection risk, it is difficult to know which party enjoys more benefits of 
internalizers (Grammig & Theissen, 2012, pp. 99–100).   
Using the limit order book to derive economic value is not new and has been used 
to improve profitability as well as predict short-term asset returns in the past (Kozhan & 
Salmon, 2010, p. 1–2). Nevertheless, some research has suggested that profitability 
derived from LOB information has been reduced over the past five years as these 
methods have become more widely exploited (Kozhan & Salmon, 2010, p. 20). For 
instance, in 2010, Kozhan and Salmon back-tested a series of algorithmic trading 
strategies based on information contained in the limit order book and determined that, as 
recently as 2003, a “high level of profitability” was achievable based on such 
  68 
information. Nevertheless, when Kozhan and Salmon tested the same strategies against a 
dataset from 2008, the level of profitability was significantly reduced, though not 
eliminated. Kozhan and Salmon concluded that this finding was in line with Lo’s 2004 
proposed adaptive market hypothesis, AMH, which is a revisited modification to the 
longstanding economic principles of efficient market hypothesis, EMH (Kozhan & 
Salmon, 2010, p. 23). Professor of Economics at MIT’s Sloan School of Management, 
Andrew Lo, first reminds the reader that EMH claims that investors will never profit 
from information-based trading because all information in efficient frictionless markets is 
instantaneously incorporated into the price as the information is released and all other 
price movements are random (Lo, 2004, p. 16). Lo goes on to proposed an evolutionary 
twist on the classic EMH called adaptive market hypothesis where “prices reflect as 
much information as dictated by the combination of environmental conditions and the 
number and nature of ‘species’ in the economy or, to use a more appropriate biological 
term, the ecology” (Lo, 2004, p. 23).  
What Lo meant by this rather odd biological/economic principle is that when 
different groups of market participants (i.e., differing species of market segments such as 
pension funds, retail investors, educational endowment managers, etc.) compete for one 
particular single market, such as treasury bonds, then that market will be more efficient. 
Furthermore, as the efficiency is increased the market becomes less profitable. 
Conversely, when efficiency is low or decreased because various market participants are 
less interested in competing for a particular market, such as Italian renaissance oil 
paintings, then profitability is expected to increase (Lo, 2004, p. 23). Lo goes on to 
explain that as cultural biases inherent in the various market participants or species shift, 
specific markets efficiencies rise and fall, depending on the focus of the participants’ 
biases. As the efficiencies rise and fall, Lo predicts profitability, in accordance with 
EMH, is reduced and increased, respectively (Lo, 2004, p. 24). Kozhan and Salmon tie 
this principle to their findings that as different investor segments increase their focus on 
the information contained in the limit order book from 2003 to 2008, profitability of that 
information has been reduced in accordance with the increase in efficiency (Kozhan & 
Salmon, 2010, p. 23).   
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G. ASSUMPTIONS 
This model, which is based on the limit order book as a proxy for short-term 
sensitivity, has a number of required assumptions that, when invalid, would invalidate the 
model put forth. These assumptions, including the distribution of informed traders along 
with the probability of the presence of false liquidity, are described, defended, and 
supported in the face of invalidation below.  
1. Distribution of Informed Traders 
As discussed previously, an informed trader is a market participant acting on non-
public information to gain a competitive advantage in the open market. This is closely 
related to the already outlined problem of adverse selection, as the uniformed trader 
unknowingly exchanges with a more informed trader. Some research has found evidence 
to support the idea that informed traders favor market orders to reduce information 
leakage and ensure execution before their information’s value expires. Gilles Daniel’s 
2006 PhD dissertation, “Asynchronous Simulations of a Limit Order Book”, found 
evidence to support this claim, and concludes, after running a variety of simulations on 
how price level stability is affected by liquidity, that price changes are the result of 
uniformed, liquidity supplying traders [e.g., limit orders] rather than informed traders that 
by in large demand liquidity [e.g., market orders] (Daniel, 2006, p. 173). 
While many agree with Daniel that informed traders will invariably use market 
orders so as to limit information leakage and improve execution times, some research has 
been found to support the theory that “if the cost of being picked-off by an informed 
trader is lower than the expected gain to limit order execution then a limit order strategy 
can be profitable” (Kozhan & Salmon, 2010, pp. 4). Put differently, limit order trading by 
informed traders can be profitable, when the cost of information leakage and reduced 
execution times is low. Still others have found that informed traders actually prefer limit 
orders and that “informed traders may act strategically … using passive limit order to 
hide information [emphasis added]” (Pascual & Veredas, 2009, p. 530). Others claim that 
market order traders are the most “uninformed,” not because of information leakage or 
the trade-offs involved in execution time, but because market order traders are willing to 
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pay (accept) any price the market offers with no regard for the value of the underlying 
equity (Dick, 2012). Finally some research has found that informed traders are indifferent 
to order types, instead impatient traders, regardless of how informed, favor market orders, 
and patient traders, also regardless of how informed, favor limit orders (Pascual & 
Veredas, 2009, p. 528).  
To summarize, the three perspectives on the distribution of traders asserts that 
informed traders favor either limit or market orders, or neither, and instead order choice 
type is dictated by other factors, including the patience level of the trader at the time the 
order was placed. While not necessarily invalidated under the first position, informed 
traders favor market over limit orders, the face-validity of the model put forth in this 
chapter would be strengthened considerably under either the second or third position; 
informed traders favor limit orders; or no correlation exists between private information 
and the type of order preferred. If, in fact, informed traders favor market orders, then due 
to the short-term value of the trader’s private information, short-term return models, such 
as this one, should focus on the behavior of those investors compared to those of the 
uninformed traders in the limit order book. Nevertheless, when the contrary is true, then 
placing the model’s focus, or proxy, on the contents of the limit order book seems 
appropriate and reasonable. Lastly, if the final supposition is correct, and an even 
distribution of informed traders exists between market and limit orders, then the selection 
of the LOB as the acting proxy for short-term sensitivity would appear to be no better or 
worse than any other indicator to adjust the capital asset pricing model using short-term 
metrics.     
2. The Probability of Presented False Liquidity 
Of great concern and more problematic than the distribution of informed traders is 
the presence of false liquidity in the limit order book. False liquidity is a very different 
matter from hidden liquidity previously discussed in the literature review. Where hidden 
liquidity consists of orders not visible to the trading public, false liquidity is comprised of 
orders visible to the trading public, but that will never be executed. Moreover, the orders, 
while placed for a variety of purposes, are never intended to be executed and are canceled 
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before a market order can withdraw the limit order’s liquidity. Unfortunately, as was also 
discussed in the review of literature, increasing cancellation rates can be alarmingly high, 
35% for non-HFT and 96% for HFT (Tabb, 2012). Additionally on some international 
exchanges, nearly 37% of all limit orders are not only cancelled, but also cancelled within 
2 seconds of submission (Fong & Liu, 2010, pp. 1873–1874). These statistics suggest a 
great deal of false liquidity is present in current market conditions, and warrants further 
examination to determine what, if any, effect this false liquidity may have on the model.    
Fong and Liu, of The University of South Wales and the Australian National 
University, respectively, examined this issue in their published work, “Limit Order 
Revisions”. Fong and Liu find that order revisions, either a cancelation or a cancel and 
replace, occur for two reasons. The first reason to cancel, or cancel and replace, is when 
the trader decides the non-execution (NE) risk is unacceptably high – that is the limit bid 
(ask) price falls (rises) unacceptability far from the last executed trade. The contra-risk to 
NE and the second major reason for order cancelation is the free option (FO) risk. FO 
risk arises because the nature of a limit order provides what is essentially an options 
contract for the order size with no required premium. While with rising NE risk, the trade 
is increasingly unlikely to execute, conversely as FO risk rises, the trade is increasingly 
likely to execute (Fong & Liu, 2010, p. 1873). Unfortunately, Fong and Liu find that the 
probability of cancelation, or ultimately false liquidity, increases with both the size of the 
order and the proximity of the order price to the price of the last trade (Fong & Liu, 2010, 
pp. 1873–1877, 1881). In other words, as both the order size increases and the bid/ask 
price becomes more competitive, the risk of cancelation also increases. In fact, Fong and 
Liu find that 90% of the revisions and cancelations occur within the first two price steps 
down the buy side and up the sell side of the entire limit order book (Fong & Liu, 2010, 
p. 1879). This is unfortunate because those are the very same order for which the model 
gives the most weight when measuring the short-term sensitivity of the asset against the 
short-term sensitivity of the broader market. Also important to note, because it may affect 
the accuracy of the model depending upon when the calculation are made, Fong and Liu 
find that cancelation and revision “activity intensifies near the end of trading hours” 
(Fong & Liu, 2010, pp. 1878–1881).   
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While the simple first question is what undermining effect will invalidating the 
assumed liquidity in the limit order book have on the presented model, the second more 
complex question is when an undermining effect is suspected, how can the model be 
adjusted to compensate for this incorrect assumption? Fortunately, it may be that the false 
liquidity detected by Fong and Liu will not affect the accuracy of the limit order book 
balance proxy for short-term sensitivity, because NE and FO risk exist in both the 
broader market and the individually assessed security, essentially canceling out when the 
ratio is computed. This assumes the false liquidity in both the broader market and the 
individual security exists in the same proportion (i.e., particular securities are more or 
less prone to false liquidity); an assumption for which unfortunately none of which the 
reviewed literature has explored or concluded on in either the affirmative or negative. 
Furthermore, and contributing to the validity of the model, nothing in Fong and Liu’s 
research suggests that one particular side of the limit order book is more likely to be filled 
with revised or canceled orders. If one side of the limit order book was more likely to 
contain false liquidity the liquidity ratios calculated would be less likely to truly represent 
the liquidity, in the marketplace or the particular security. Fortunately, no research has 
suggested such an imbalance exists.        
H. DECEIVING THE PROXY 
While Fong and Liu identify two reasons for false liquidity, NE and FO, other 
more probing and algorithmic, less risk-oriented, motives exist, and may represent a not 
insignificant portion of the limit order book. Accordingly, the proxy and model 
presented, and in fact, any system employing the limit order book as a source for 
estimating security returns or trading strategies, may have reduced accuracy and value 
from the incentive to expose false liquidity. Dark pool liquidity detection techniques and 
manipulative algorithms are two examples when order may present false liquidity in 
addition to the more innocuous risk motives described by Fong and Liu. These two cases 
bear addressing for probability and, when probable, mitigation techniques for identifying 
and dismissing such liquidity. 
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1. Liquidity Detection 
One of the most popular trading algorithms aims to detect hidden liquidity, and in 
so doing, may place false liquidity, very briefly, on the LOB inadvertently (Banks, 2010, 
p. 125). A general example of this will help illustrate the phenomenon. To begin, assume 
that an institutional investor has to make a large buy order, perhaps 10,000 shares of 
ABC Corporation by the close of daily trading. In order to avoid market impact, that is, a 
rise in purchase price from the large buy order, the investor lists his 10,000-share limit 
order as a hidden order in a dark pool with a bid midway between the national best bid 
and offer. Unaware of the hidden order, a second actor, the fisher, attempting to locate 
large hidden orders like this one (ultimately for front-running purposes—though this is a 
separate discussion), sends a series of small, no more than 100 shares, limit immediate-
or-cancel (IOC) orders to dark pools with offer prices also midway between the 
advertised best bid and offer. If the fisher’s 100-share order is submitted to the dark pool 
with the hidden order, then the order executes, leaving the remaining 9,900 shares still 
hidden. Otherwise the fisher’s 100-share order is canceled after a specified period of time 
elapses from less than a second to a few minutes. During the interval between the 
reception of the order and its cancelation, the limit order will be displayed on the LOB 
unless it has been given clear instructions not to forward the order beyond the targeted 
dark pool (Banks, 2010, p. 134). This liquidity, however brief, is clearly unintentional 
and including it in either complex or simple liquidity metrics may degrade the accuracy 
of the model. This is especially true in the complex model because more value is placed 
on liquidity near the NBBO, the very place the false liquidity in this example is likely to 
appear, though this is may not always be the case and where false liquidity appears in the 
pursuit of liquidity detection.   
2. Manipulative Algorithms 
Some algorithms meant to manipulate market prices in the short-run may present 
false liquidity. One such example is the technique of ‘quote stuffing’, as addressed by 
both the Norges Bank Investment Management group in 2013 and the 112th U.S. 
Congressional hearing on Examining Computerized Trading in 2012. The practice of 
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‘quote stuffing’ by sophisticated HFT firms and others, relies on submitting a large 
number of orders and cancellations on both sides of a trade in rapid succession, with the 
intent to slow down the release of market data to the broader public. Once the release of 
market data has been sufficiently slowed, the trading firm exploits their speed to make 
riskless trades based on their now proprietary knowledge of where the market price will 
return once the firm stops the stuffing orders. Additionally, these rapid trades create, 
however briefly, false midpoints (i.e., half the difference from the highest bid and the 
lowest offer). Dark pool operators then go on to use these false midpoints as reference 
points in their own algorithms for determining protocols such as execution precedence 
(NBIM, 2013, pp. 10, 13). 
Not only are these manipulative behaviors iniquitous, they are frequent enough to 
merit discussion as to how they might affect the accuracy of a limit order book based 
model, such as the one proposed. Market research has found that quote stuffing “is 
pervasive with several hundred events occurring each trading day and that over 74 
percent of U.S. listed equity securities experience at least one episode during 2010” 
(Reed & Crapo, 2012, p. 36).  Although certainly troubling, the characterization of 
“pervasive” may be a slight exaggeration. Nevertheless, with these techniques affecting 
less than 8% of the market on a daily basis, the trend is still sufficiently widespread to 
warrant further discussions on the affect it may have on the model (Santoli, 2013). The 
quantity of false liquidity could be prevalent on either side of the LOB, depending on the 
side of the trade the stuffer targets. Proposed regulations to eliminate ‘quote stuffing’ and 
other malicious trading practices designed to manipulate market prices in the short-term 
include requiring substantial price improvement, more than $0.001, before internalizers, 
such as dark pools change execution precedence; mandating unique identifiers for all 
trades to eliminate the veil of anonymity in market actions; and requiring a 50 ms 
minimum quote life to discourage the processing/speed arms race in the high-frequency 
trading industry (Reed & Crapo, 2012, pp. 36–39). If enacted, these reforms would not 
only level the playing field for investors of all classes, but it would go a long way toward 
reducing the false liquidity levels across the limit order books and thus improve the 
accuracy of the proposed model.     
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IV. DARK POOL DENIALS: ALTERNATIVE PROXIES AND 
APPROACHES  
Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.  
—Physicist Niels Bohr (1885–1962) 
 
Alternative trading systems (dark pools) pose significant problems for the model 
outlined in the previous chapter. Before those problems are examined and solutions 
discussed, a brief review of the rise of dark pools provides needed context regarding the 
equity market landscape as it stands today. This chapter begins by discussing what 
solutions dark pools provide to markets and market participants. The chapter then 
addresses the unintended consequences these dark pools have in general and on macro-
level liquidity models, such as the one proposed. The chapter then addresses and 
proposes alternative macro and micro-level liquidity proxies, other than the LOB. From 
there, the chapter looks beyond liquidity, and discusses several other metrics of short-
term sensitivity, both proposed and tested in outside research including social network 
trends, “expert” forums contributions, and a specific web query statistic known as the 
search volume index (SVI). Finally, the chapter concludes by revisiting both the efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH) and the adaptive market hypothesis (AMH), briefly addressed 
in Chapter III. These theories are examined in light of the various proxies, answering the 
question of how EMH and AMH theorists would expect the market to respond to 
widespread employment of these metrics in return analysis.  
A. SOLUTIONS DARK POOLS PROVIDE 
As was first addressed in Chapter I, dark pools offer a number of significant 
advantages over their lit counterparts including confidentiality, reduced market impact, 
cost savings, and even price improvement. The nature of dark pools offers participants 
confidentiality by not openly publishing the contents of the limit order book to market 
actors. A side effect of this confidentiality is a reduction in market impact of large trades. 
For example, it is not unreasonable to expect that when a large institutional block buy 
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trade was made public, as it would be in a lit exchange, smaller market participants 
would try to jump ahead of the block order, effectively pushing up the purchase price for 
the institutional investor. This effect, known as market impact, is reduced in dark pools 
because anticipating the removal of that liquidity by the institutional investor is more 
difficult, though not impossible (Banks, 2010, pp. 5–6, 125).  
Dark pools also offer long-term transactional cost savings through increased 
competition in the exchange landscape. In March of 1792, the “Buttonwood Agreements” 
established a central monopoly exchange in New York, which was the precursor to the 
New York Stock Exchange (Markham & Harty, 2010, pp. 868–869). In 1861, and in the 
face of rising competition, the NYSE board made changes to the exchange’s constitution, 
prohibiting exchange members from trading securities outside of the NYSE (Markham & 
Harty, 2010, p. 869). This exchange monopoly would continue relatively unrivaled for 
nearly a century until the National Association of Security Dealers (NASD), formed a 
rival exchange in 1968, the Nasdaq. Even with increased competition from the Nasdaq 
and other in house broker/dealer exchanges, the NYSE continued to execute nearly 70% 
of all trading volume and 80% of all listed company trading volume as recently as 1993 
(Markham & Harty, 2010, p. 877). Against strong objections on market fragmentation 
and reduced liquidity concerns from the NYSE, central market regulatory changes in the 
1990s allowed the Nasdaq and other electronic exchanges (ECNs) to grow both in 
popularity and volumes. By 2000, the NYSE was faced with a full-fledged competitor for 
the first time as Nasdaq volume began to eclipse the New York Stock Exchange by 
nearly a billion shares a day (Markham & Harty, 2010, pp. 880, 899). While Nasdaq was 
gaining ground on the NYSE, the SEC put in place another regulation in 1998, Reg ATS, 
which would govern the rules for creating and operating alternative trading systems. Rule 
301 of Reg ATS defines ATSs as registered, self-governed, public quote systems 
operated as broker/dealer exchanges with 5% or more of the total daily trading volume 
(Banks, 2010, p. 8). With volumes as a proxy for exchange profit and with the rise in 
trading volumes on ATSs (dark pools) to nearly 20% of total trading volume by 2010, 
both market fragmentation and competition have substantially increased over the past 
century (Bank, 2010, p. 6). All of this is to say, competition in the exchange landscape 
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has led to a significant reduction in fees, to the lowest levels since the modern markets’ 
inception, as exchanges vie for liquidity and volume (Hau, 2006, p. 863). These lower 
fees can, at least in part, be attributed to the rise and dominance of ECNs along with 
ATSs over the past 100 years broadly, compounded by substantial market fragmentation 
over the past twenty years (Lee, 2007, pp. 2–3, 20). A visual breakdown, by volume of 
market fragmentation, as of 2007, is shown in Figure 24. While at the time of publication 
Direct Edge, BATS were the leading third-party dark pools, since publication, still others 
have grown in volume, such as Instinet and LeveL ATS (Banks, 2010, p. 199). The 
broker/dealer dark pools are also known as internalizers, as discussed in previous 
chapters.  
  
Figure 24.  Market Fragmentation of as Q3 2007 (from Lee, 2007, p. 2) 
As an aside, some research has suggested that the unfortunate consequence of this 
cost reduction or loss of trading friction is an increase in volatility, as barriers to trade 
have been removed. This research has led some prominent economists to suggest a 
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volatility, including John Maynard Keynes and former Secretary of the Treasury, 
Lawrence Summers  (Summers & Summers, 1989 pp. 262–263). 
The last great advantage dark pools provide is price improvement. While 
operating under the U.S. paradigm of a national best bid offer system, at first, price 
improvement over the market price appears superficially impossible, however, in light of 
the reduced market impact described above, price improvement is possible and 
achievable. Considering the institutional buyer example above, any achieved reduction in 
market impact is going to have a direct relationship to a lower cost basis of the share 
purchases by the institutional investor. This lowered cost basis is the final advantage, and 
driving factor “a venue that can interact with dark liquidity to routinely deliver price 
improvement will attract interest” (Bank, 2010, pp. 6–7).               
B. PROBLEMS DARK POOLS CREATE 
While the rise of ATSs and internalizers provide significant benefits as described, 
dark pool detractors offer a number of legitimate critiques stemming from a lack of 
transparency and excessive market fragmentation. Additionally, dark pool hidden 
liquidity make calculating aggregate cross exchange liquidity levels difficult.  
1. Lack of Transparency   
Apprehensions stemming from dark pools and an absence of transparency are 
both growing and considerable. The most vocal of critics are concerned about unintended 
consequences of the anonymity, the difficulty in auditing problematic algorithms, as well 
as incomprehensible order flow and matching procedures. Since 2012, regulators and 
industry insiders have recommended supervisory changes to dark pools that would 
require unique identifiers, tied to market participants, to be attached to successfully 
matched orders. This would remove “the cloak of anonymity that has allowed for 
manipulative behavior” and provide for emergency contact information (Reed & Crapo, 
2012, p. 5). These unique identifiers would provide market participants and regulators the 
security construct of non-repudiation, principally the prohibition of actors to deny actions 
taken. Not only does such a list of authorized dark pool actors not exist, today the 
converse is true; thus “anonymity is protected by SEC under Reg ATS, so there isn’t a 
  79 
single consolidated list of ATSs and the SEC will only provide the information under a 
Freedom of Information Act filing” (Tabb, 2012, pp. 10-11). 
Closely related to the manipulative market behavior allowed by anonymity is the 
discussion of audit trails. Audit trails, that is a detailed record of trades executed, by 
whom, at what price and time, is neither required nor exists in most dark pools. Just as in 
the case of non-repudiation above, comprehensive audit trails would also have a “chilling 
effect” on manipulative behavior, allowing regulators to quickly and easily “reconstruct 
what happened within the market” (Reed & Crapo, 2012, p. 21). Additionally, 
comprehensive audit trails would provide market participants greater ability to evaluate 
trading algorithms for effectiveness, identifying bugs early and often to reduce mishaps, 
such as the flash crash in May 2010. Although anomalies in algorithms will never be 
eliminated, comprehensive audit trails, currently not implemented in dark pools, would 
provide developers an outlet to recreate market actions to better respond in the future 
(Reed & Crapo, 2012, pp. 1, 20).       
The last major concern stemming from a lack of transparency is the unpublished 
matching priorities of individual dark pools. While matching priorities in lit exchanges 
are open and defined, based on price discrimination as well as order arrival time, dark 
pools matching protocols and order routing methodologies are private and considered by 
many dark pool operators to be proprietary (Tabb, 2012, pp. 10-11). One such example of 
proprietary matching protocol gone awry comes from an SEC investigation into Pipeline 
Trading Systems, a now shuttered dark pool operator. Although Pipeline was assumed to 
be matching buyers and sellers with dark liquidity, in fact, the operators were secretly 
trading against clients, often for a profit (Reed & Crapo, 2012, p. 82). Pipeline ultimately 
settled with the SEC for deliberately taking advantage of their matchmaker role in 
marketplace and reopened under a different name, Aritas (Patterson & Strasburg, 2012). 
While Pipeline’s procedures may not be indicative of how most dark pools operate, 
critics maintain that the industry-wide opaque matching protocols contribute to a 
deterioration of investor confidence (Reed & Crapo, 2012, p. 81) Additionally, 
difficulties measuring aggregate liquidity stem from a lack of transparency. This issue is 
discussed separately because of the effect this concern has on the model put forth in 
Chapter III.  
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2. Market Fragmentation 
While exchange competition has decreased transaction costs, there are a number 
of less tangible costs incurred from decentralizing the exchange market structure. With 
stocks trading electronically on 13 national securities exchanges and more than 50 dark 
pools, many believe the market is overly fragmented and in turn overly complex (Reed & 
Crapo, 2012, pp. 8). The critics endorse the idea that the overly fragmented state of the 
markets has led to trends, such as adverse selection and widening price spreads to rise. 
Additionally, critics point to the differences in regulations governing lit and dark 
exchanges as contributing only to the complexity of the landscape, and that a unified 
regulatory approach would “level the playing field” for both exchanges (Reed & Crapo, 
2012, pp. 17, 46).  
As was already briefly discussed in Chapter III, adverse selection, trading with a 
more informed actor to the detriment of the less informed, poses considerable obstacles to 
investor confidence. Some believe market fragmentation, and specifically dark pool 
growth in volume and quantity, increases the probability of adverse selection. Again 
speaking before Congress, Lauer of Better Markets, a market structure and high-
frequency trading consultant firm, describes the state of adverse selection when he 
claims, “As order flow goes from place to place … before it gets to the lit exchange, it is 
picked off at every step of the way by internalizers, by dark pools, by high-frequency 
traders, proprietary trading desks” (Reed & Crapo, 2012, p. 17). Lauer goes on to address 
the remaining order, finally hitting the common exchanges, when he says, “the flow that 
eventually gets to the lit exchanges is what we refer to in the industry as toxic flow that 
nobody wants to trade with” (Reed & Crapo, 2012, p. 17). Lauer and others believe the 
overly complex order routing procedures, starting with internalizers, then internal and 
external dark pools, then ultimately lit exchanges, as depicted in Figure 5, significantly 
affects the quality of the liquidity in the conventional exchanges. This also provides a 
challenge to the model presented in the previous chapter, as this is the very liquidity 
against which short-term sensitivity is measured. If Lauer is correct, and this liquidity 
represents the remains of uninformed investors, so-called ‘toxic flow’, then the validity of 
the model is uncertain, at best, and possibly misleading, at worst.     
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Some research has shown that bid/ask spreads are widening as a result of 
fragmented liquidity spread between the dozen national exchanges and 50 dark pools. 
Specifically, one such study out of Rutgers University finds that since the rise in 
popularity of alternative trading venues, bid/ask spreads at the NYSE have increased by 
an average of $1.28. While a $1.28 may seem superficially insignificant, over the long-
term this dramatically increases transaction costs, volatility, and market friction (Reed & 
Crapo, 2012, pp. 17, 37). While causality has proved difficult to assess, research has 
shown a positive correlation between bid-ask spreads and volatility (Frank & Garcia, 
2010, p. 222). Additionally, transaction costs are indirectly raised proportionally to the 
increases in the spread as market orders are forced to accept the lower (higher) bid (ask) 
price. Finally, although not synonymous with transactions costs, market friction (i.e., the 
ease at which investor can move between investments and cash) is increased with 
transaction costs (Langlois, 2005, p. 2). Although a solution outside of some degree of 
consolidation is unclear, for these reasons and others, widening spreads as a result of 
market fragmentation, are of great concern to industry experts, regulators, and governing 
bodies (Reed & Crapo, 2012, p. 17). 
The last concern stemming from market fragmentation is that different regulations 
governing lit and dark exchanges have led to an overly complex rule set, which is, though 
unintentionally, negatively affecting investor confidence and their command of the 
exchange landscape. Advocates of unified rule sets governing lit and dark pools believe 
that incorporating Reg ATS within Reg NMS will provide investors, financial 
professionals, regulators, and the broader public a clearer understand of market 
mechanism. Although some regulations will continue to be separate out of necessity (i.e., 
hiding large block liquidity is the point of dark pools and will need to be preserved), 
some rules could be more broadly applied without undue burden to the exchanges, such 
as requiring more substantial price improvement, more than $0.001 for example, for 
execution priority to discourage front-running (Reed & Crapo, 2012, p. 37). Critics of 
this approach believe that subjecting dark pools to similar regulatory requirements, as 
their lit counterparts, will dampen the innovation they provide, marking a return to a 
market landscape where large institutional investors are easily identified and exploited 
(Reed & Crapo, 2012, p. 22). 
  82 
3. Measuring Aggregate Liquidity 
The final cost from the rise in dark pools is the considerable difficulty in 
measuring aggregate liquidity in the marketplace. As was mentioned previously, this cost 
stems from the lack of transparency inherent in a design principle of dark pools. That 
design principle, to protect large block order liquidity from exploitation, necessitates the 
unfortunate side effect of hiding, not only single large block orders, but aggregate 
liquidity, and so there is no publically displayed limit order book. Again speaking to 
Congress on the topic of detecting aggregate market liquidity supply, Andrew Brooks, 
Vice President of US Equity Trading at T. Rowe Price Associates said, “it is awfully hard 
to figure out the supply demand equation in the stock today when there are so many 
different places that trading interests reside” (Reed & Crapo, 2012, p. 17). This is a 
considerable obstacle for implementing the model outlined in the previous chapter. The 
remainder of this chapter will look at overcoming this obstacle through alternative 
methods of measuring aggregate liquidity using both what LOB data is available, beyond 
the LOB, and, more broadly, alternatives to liquidity for measuring short-term sensitivity.  
C. VISIBLE LOB AS A SAMPLE FROM THE LARGER LIQUIDITY 
POPULATION 
Measuring both sides (buy/sell) of aggregate liquidity of a single security across 
13 national exchanges, more than 50 dark pools, not to mention dozens of internalized 
exchanges collocated with broker/dealers, then comparing that against the aggregate 
liquidity of both sides of the entire market is not feasible because of the design principles 
involved in the operations of those exchanges, specifically internalizers and dark pools. 
Unfortunately, information gleaned from the few exchanges with open limit order books 
cannot be considered a sample taken from a larger population of liquidity because the 
population distribution is unknown and the sample taken from the population cannot be 
randomized. Any sample taken from the open limit order book would fail the 
randomization test because not all orders are equally likely of selection. In fact, a large 
portion of the population, those orders placed or executed in dark pools and internalizers, 
are specifically excluded from the population (Plackett, 1971, pp. 91–94). Although a 
different context, this selection problem is what Lauer references when explaining how 
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only liquidity is “picked off” before arriving at the lit exchanges. The “picking off” 
process at various non-public exchanges along the way depicted in Figure 5 leaves the 
remaining data set sample non-random, and therefore difficult to make inference 
conclusions on the larger population’s sensitivity to short-run metrics such as liquidity.     
D. MICRO-LEVEL (SINGLE ORDER) LIQUIDITY, NO PROXY REQUIRED 
While measuring market-wide, aggregate liquidity may not be feasible because of 
the growth in dark pools and internalizers, observing micro liquidity, that is single orders, 
was feasible until recently through so-called “flash orders”. First introduced in the 
options market in 2004, flash orders are limit orders originating in either dark pools or 
internalizers that are not marketable, that is, not immediately executed (DeCovny, 2010, 
p. 28). After the order is placed and not executed, but before it is routed to lit and open 
exchanges, the details of the order, size, bid/ask price, et cetera, are flashed for other 
broker/dealers participating in the market as a “second chance” for the order to execute. 
If after the flash, the order still is not executed, it is then forwarded to the lit exchanges. 
Some exchanges, such as the Nasdaq’s Dark Pool, INET, will, by default, flash orders 
even if the order instructions detail the order as non-routable. Many have criticized this 
practice as antithetical to the raison d'être of dark pools; protect large single order from 
information leakage (Schmerken, 2009, p. 5). Supporters of flash orders have countered 
by insisting orders are not required to flash regardless of routing instructions, and 
decisions on whether orders are flashed should be left up to market participants not 
regulators.  
In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission, along with its chairperson 
Mary Schapiro, first proposed a ban on flash order. According to Schapiro, “flash orders 
have the potential to discourage publically displayed trading interest and harm quote 
competition among market” (Mehta, 2009, p. 20). Schapiro and other critics believe, 
correctly, that publically displayed trading interests, namely from open limit order books, 
are reduced as flashed orders are taken out of liquidity before they are routed to public 
exchanges. Additionally, Schapiro criticizes the two-tiered design where only a small 
portion of the overall market pays to receive flash orders from proprietary feeds operated 
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by the dark exchanges. In the wake of the SEC proposal, many, but not all, dark pools 
have shut down their flash order mechanisms. Since 2009, however, the SEC has made 
no statements about plans to implement the ban.   
Unfortunately, these micro-liquidity single flash orders provide little context for 
extrapolating to aggregate liquidity metrics as described in Chapter III. Again, as was the 
case with the visible LOB previously addressed, selection bias proves to be a limiting 
factor, as those orders that either unknowingly or intentionally choose to display 
otherwise hidden liquidity cannot be inferred to be a representative sample of the broader 
liquidity population. Beyond the controversial practice of front running, these orders may 
offer limited economic value. Perhaps, aside from political pressure, this is why many 
dark exchanges are no longer publishing such orders and/or never began the practice.    
E. BEYOND LIQUIDITY: OTHER PROPOSALS FOR ADJUSTING 
RETURN ESTIMATES IN THE SHORT-RUN 
It will now be of some value to expand the proxy search beyond liquidity, because 
of the previously outlined limitations in its observations, both in the aggregate and at the 
single order level. The theory and practice of economic forecasting is not new and the 
topic has intrigued economists for decades. For example, in 1990, recently retired Federal 
Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke advocated that interest rate spreads, defined as the 
difference in rates between various financial assets, could serve as a viable predictor of 
future economic activity and growth (Bernanke, 1990, pp. 51–52). Specifically, Bernanke 
investigated the forecasting reliability derived from the difference between commercial 
bond interest rates and the Treasury bill rate. Bernanke postulates that the economic 
activity is negatively correlated with the interest rate spread, because either a) the interest 
rate on commercial paper will rise, faster than Treasury bills, as investors observe an 
economic downturn, or b) the interest rate spread is a derivative of monetary policy, and 
that future decreases (increases) in economic activity will force the federal reserve to 
lower (raise) the target rate, ultimately widening (narrowing) the interest rate spread 
(Bernanke, 1990, p. 52). While Bernanke does not conclude with either hypothesis, he 
rather outlines specific predictions that, if true, in the coming decades will confirm which 
hypothesis is the more likely, and what value can be gleaned from the interest rate spread 
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moving forward. As a perfect transition to a discussion on the lessons of both the efficient 
and adaptive market hypothesis, these predictions are visited at the conclusion of this 
segment. Firstly, however, this section examines various other predictive proxies in 
current research, including social network activity, search activity on two different 
engines, and Internet forum posts, also on two different forums.  
Stemming from the open nature of the network and protocol, Twitter has served, 
with varying levels of success, as the focus for many studies in prediction. Though only 
peripherally related to financial markets and prediction, one of the clearest, thorough, and 
well-reasoned studies examines both the truthfulness along with the newsworthiness of 
Twitter feeds as an “automatic discovery process” (Castillo, Mendoza, & Poblete, 2012, 
p. 560). Although not related directly to prediction, research of this nature is included in 
the discussion based upon the assumption that any predictive protocol’s success would, at 
least in part, be a function of the protocol’s ability to distinguish between true/false and 
varying degrees of relevance to the prediction at hand. The authors examine, both on 
aggregate and single tweet levels, the micro blogging service during natural disasters and 
emergencies. Additionally, in section five, the authors outline a classifier protocol for 
first determining the truthfulness of tweet, then, after false tweets have been discarded, 
determines the tweet’s newsworthiness using historically observed correlative 
relationships. Some of the most useful relationships include a positive correlation 
between credible tweets with URL sourcing, follower counts of the author, and length of 
the tweet. Furthermore, the study found a negative correlation relationship between 
credible tweets and excessive punctuations, specifically question marks, exclamations, as 
well as the frequency of first and third person pronouns (Castillo, Mendoza, & Poblete, 
2012, pp. 574–576). On the evaluations of newsworthiness, which could be aptly refined 
and re-designated market newsworthiness, the authors find a negative correlation 
between relevance and frequency of hashtags, emoticons, as well as a positive correlation 
with respect to tweet length and “fraction of URLs pointing to domains in the top 100 
most visited” (Castillo, Mendoza, & Poblete, 2012, pp. 572–574). Using those correlative 
relationships the authors built a cascading protocol to first automatically evaluate the 
newsworthiness in addition to the credibility of tweets. While the author’s protocol failed 
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to improve on evaluating newsworthiness levels in tweets when compared to human 
evaluation, it did succeed when evaluating credibility levels (Castillo, Mendoza, & 
Poblete, 2012, p. 579). Protocols such as this, and others like it, may become increasingly 
valuable to financial professionals or investors for use in both predictive algorithms, as is 
discussed next, and high-frequency trading algorithms that respond dynamically to 
breaking news, as is discussed briefly in Chapter V.    
1. Aggregate Twitter Activity Forecasts Broader Economy and Industry  
Three studies, two in 2011 and one in 2012, examine the relationship between 
aggregate Twitter feeds and the broader equity market in the U.S. While Bollen, Mao, 
and Zeng (2011) examine a predicative correlation between the “mood” on Twitter and 
the closing price of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), Zhang, Fuehres, and Gloor 
(2011) examine a predictive positive correlation between a fear/hope index with the 
DJIA, and a negative correlation to the volatility index, VIX. Zhang, Fuehres, and 
Gloor’s follow-up work in 2012, continues to focus on Twitter feeds, while broadening 
the predictive realm to currencies, commodities, and employment outlook. Returning to 
the 2011 studies, Bollen et al. find that on Twitter, when quantified, only expressions of 
calmness have a “causality relationship with DJIA for lags ranging 2-6 days.” Ultimately 
without predicative qualities, Bollen et al. examine quantified expressions of alertness, 
sureness, vitality, kindness and happiness, drawing on data set collected from February to 
December 2008 (Bollen, Mao, & Zeng, 2011, pp. 2, 5). Graphical representation of the 
predictive relationship, normalized, between calmness and the DJIA is depicted in Figure 
25. 
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Figure 25.  Normalized: Day-to-Day Differences of DJIA with Twitter Calm Index 
Overlaid (Top), Day-to-Day Differences of DJIA (Middle), and Twitter Calm 
Index (Bottom) (from Bollen, Mao, & Zeng, 2011, p. 5)  
Zhang, Fuehres, and Gloor’s 2011 study finds somewhat contradictory results 
when examining a dataset of roughly 40,000 tweets per day from 30 March to 7 
September 2009 (Zhang, Fuehres, & Gloor, 2011, p. 56). Zhang et al. examine the 
predictive relationship between emotion levels expressed in tweets with the direction of 
the DJIA, S&P 500, and Nasdaq on the following trading day, finding a negative 
correlation between the level of emotion and those indexes. This negative correlation 
existed regardless of whether the emotional level stemmed from positive or negative 
sentiment. In the words of the authors, and with mild exaggeration, “when the emotions 
on Twitter fly high, that is when people express a lot of hope, fear, and worry, the [index] 
goes down the next day” (Zhang, Fuehres, & Gloor, 2011, pp. 60-61).  
The authors’ more compressive 2012 follow-on work examines a broader set of 
keywords including “gold”, “dollar”, “$”, “oil”, “economy”, and “job” with their 
relationship to market movement across equities, currencies, and commodities. Zhang et 
al.’s dataset, a collection of five months of tweet from the first half of 2011, contains 
nearly 4M re-tweets from more than 961k users (Zhang, Fuehres, & Gloor, 2012, pp. 1, 
3). The authors find that, of the keywords examined, “dollar” is the most predictive 
variable with a correlation coefficient of more than .3 at t+1, decreasing coefficients at 
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t+2 and t+3. Conversely, only “$” and “job” contain a no more than chance correlation to 
the targeted markets as a predictive variable (Zhang, Fuehres, & Gloor, 2012, pp. 7, 10). 
Finally, the authors concede that their simple algorithms for re-tweet collection could 
possibly be made more effective by constraining their dataset with hashtags relevant to 
financial market sentiment, as well as considering non-linear relationships between 
Twitter sentiments at t and market movements in t+x (Zhang, Fuehres, & Gloor, 2012, p. 
11).  
2. Aggregate Twitter Activity Forecasts Individual Firm Values  
Moving away from macro-economic predictions, a number of studies have been 
conducted to examine the relationship between Twitter mentions as a forecasting variable 
for individual asset values and short-term returns. One such study examines stock prices 
and returns of 18 Fortune 500 publically trading companies and the tweets associated 
with those companies. The authors find that, beyond what can be explained by 
fluctuations in the broader market, 8.3% of the variability in the companies’ share price 
can be explained through Twitter macro analysis (Evangelopoulos, Magro, & Sidorova, 
2012, p. 247). The authors’ dataset included approximately 3.85M tweets, filtered for 
relevancy, collected from 1 November 2010 to 15 January 2011 (Evangelopoulos, Magro, 
& Sidorova, 2012, p. 252). Furthermore, and particularly relevant to this thesis, the 
authors examine what inferences, gleaned through macro evaluations of tweets, can be 
applied to the capital asset pricing model. After analyzing the findings from the dataset, 
the authors modified the CAPM such that      
 RAi = ri − rˆi = ri − (αˆ iI + βˆiI rI )   (21) 
where RA is the return anomalies for asset i, ri  is the actual return of asset i, rˆi  is the 
expected return of asset i, and αˆ iI + βˆiI rI  is the classically defined CAPM formula and 
best estimated using historical regression (Evangelopoulos, Magro, & Sidorova, 2012, 
pp. 254–255). Evangelopoulos et al. go on to discuss the return anomalies as variations in 
returns unexplained by returns in the broader market, I, and apply those return anomalies 
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to the 53 observed trading days and 18 observed companies, for a total of 954 data points, 
depicted in Equation 22. 






∑ , 1≤ i ≤ 53 , 1≤ j ≤18  (22) 
where TV is the tweet volume associate with asset j on day i, T is the “tweet topic factor” 
strength, also of asset j on day i, with a lag window of 6 days, and with 20 different 
“tweet topic factors” (Evangelopoulos, Magro, & Sidorova, 2012, pp. 254–255). The 
authors’ definitions of the 20 tweet topic factors vary from the product specific (e.g., 
Xbox or Android) to generic shopping terms such as buy, deal, or get. By breaking the 
data down by tweet topics, the authors’ teased out inferences that otherwise may have 
gone unnoticed, such as a slight negative correlation between individual firm stock 
performance in the day immediately following a spike in references to deals, gift cards, 
and sales. More broadly, the authors find a negative correlation between the sheer 
number of tweets about a firm and the firm’s stock performance on that trading day. 
Conversely, the authors find that “tweeting about ‘buying’ or ‘getting’ something is 
positively reflected in the future stock performance of the companies mentioned in those 
tweets, even though some of the effects are delayed by several days [emphasis added]” 
(Evangelopoulos, Magro, & Sidorova, 2012, pp. 255–258, 262–263). 
A different study, peripherally also related to Twitter, takes an unusual twist on 
the approaches and theories of the research already discussed. The authors’ postulate that 
instead of predicting future market forces determined firm values, social network 
aggregate buzz can instead influence future firm values. Luo and Zhang, of no relation to 
past-referenced work, focus on user-generated reviews from the online consumer report 
website CNET.com. Luo and Zhang find a positive correlation between buzz level (i.e., 
the level of advocacy for a particular brand), buzz volume (i.e., the sheer quantity of 
mentions for a particular brand) and the individual firm value (Luo & Zhang, 2013, pp. 
213, 220). When quantified, the authors find that firm buzz can explain as much as 
10.75% of individual firm value beyond what can be explained by fluctuations in the 
broader market, and as much as 11.49% of the variation in the idiosyncratic risk of the 
individual firm (Luo & Zhang, 2013, p. 227). This is not entirely unexpected. The authors 
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make clear no causal link can be established directly between the buzz and the individual 
firm’s stock price. More likely a hidden variable, such as well-received product lines and 
customer service, explain both the variations in individual return and the buzz 
surrounding a particular company or product (Luo & Zhang, 2013, pp. 226, 234–235).     
3. SVI Forecasts Individual Firm Values 
Two studies, one from 2011 and one from 2012, examine aggregate search 
histories in an aim to detect correlations between volume and firm value. Da, Engelberg, 
and Gao find that an increasing search volume index (SVI) may predict higher individual 
firm share prices with an ultimate price reversal within one year (Da, Engelberg, & Gao, 
2011, p. 1461). Google provides and defines weekly SVI for a term as the “number of 
searches for that term, scaled by its time-series average” (Da, Engelberg, & Gao, 2011, p. 
1463). A useful example of SVI is depicted in Figure 26 as a graph for the terms “diet”, 
and “cranberry”.     
 
Figure 26.  SVI Graph for “Diet” (blue) and “Cranberry” (red) (from Da, Engelberg, & 
Gao, 2011, p. 1464) 
As expected the SVI for “diet” jumps after the New Year, slowly declines 
throughout the year and then jumps again as New Year’s “resoluters” the world over 
flock to loose holiday weight. Similarly, “cranberry” SVI jumps just before Thanksgiving 
and then tapers throughout the holiday season (Da, Engelberg, & Gao, 2011, p. 1464). 
Interestingly, Da et al. finds that among stocks experiencing an increase in the average 
SVI during week t, will also experience an increase in share price by an average of 30 
basis points in weeks t+1 and t+2. The increase, however, is short-lived with a near 
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complete reversal, on average, within one year (Da, Engelberg, & Gao, 2011, p. 1465). 
Da et al. sample stocks from one of the most comprehensive U.S. indexes, the Russell 
3000, which contains the 3,000 largest firms and comprises more than 90% of the total 
U.S. public market (Da, Engelberg, & Gao, 2011, p. 1466). Da et al. conclude that their 
findings show that Google’s SVI is one of the few metrics capable of directly assessing 
investor interest outside of trading volume and returns (Da, Engelberg, & Gao, 2011, p. 
1476). While the authors make no mention of liquidity as a metric, it remains a logical 
extension of both volume and returns as a quantifiable method of assessing investor 
interest, as was described in Chapter III.  
In 2012, a second study, with a similar scope and aim, using Yahoo! search 
queries and a more limited dataset of the Nasdaq 100, Bordino et al. find a strong 
correlation between the volume of queries and the volumes of traded equities (Bordino et 
al., 2012, p. 2). Of interest, Bordino et al. find both predictive forecasting qualities 
inherent in their data, and “nowcasting” traits that show peaks in volume of search 
queries overlapping with trading volumes having a lag of up to 3 days after the search 
queries (Bordino et al., 2012, p. 2–4). A graphic example of this result, normalized peaks 
in time-series near overlapping in trading and search volume, is depicted in Figure 27.    
 
Figure 27.  NVDA’s Overlaid Normalized Trading and Query Volumes 
(from Bordino, 2012, p. 4) 
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Bordino et al. believe that this relationship, frequently referred to as the “wisdom 
of the crowds”, could be used, in addition to volatility forecasting, as a short-term stress 
test to “detect early signs of financial distress” (Bordino et al., 2012, pp. 7–8). 
4. Expert and Novice Forums Forecast Individual Firm Value 
In addition to search queries, Twitter feeds, and user-generated reviews, various 
studies have examined forums in aggregate for economic value. One of the first studies to 
examine this take on the ‘wisdom of the crowds’ effect was conducted in 2004, by two 
Canadians, Antweiler and Frank. They examine Yahoo! Finance forum boards for 
bullish/bearish sentiment, its effects on returns, the level of disagreement on boards, and 
the volume associated with those equities at the time. Additionally, the authors examined 
volatility and what information, if any, can be gleaned from the forums in advance of that 
volatility (Antweiler & Frank, 2004, p. 1259). The dataset, approximately 1.5M forum 
posts, was examined in aggregate for bullish/bearish predictions as well as the level of 
disagreement between forum users. Antweiler and Frank find that regardless of 
sentiment, while an increase level of activity predicts statistically significant negative 
returns the following day, the short-term negative returns are most likely economically 
useless compared to the required transaction costs. Additionally, the researchers find that 
disagreement levels and forum volumes on day t have a positive correlation with trading 
volumes and volatility on day t. Finally, the authors also find increased disagreement 
levels have an unexpected negative correlation with trading volumes on day t+1  
(Antweiler & Frank, 2004, p. 1264, 1292). 
A second, more recent and filtered study, from 2011, concerning forum postings 
in aggregate, targeted the Motley Fool CAPS message boards (a search internal and 
external to the boards reveal CAPS is not an acronym and is instead merely the name of 
the board). The authors, Hill and Ready-Campbell, weighted the contributions of users 
based on their historical returns. This allowed the researchers to “take better advance of 
the ‘wisdom of the crowds’ by restricting the crowd to a set of experts” (Hill & Ready-
Campbell, 2011, p. 74). The dataset, upon which the conclusions were drawn was 
collected from January 2007 to December 2009 and contained more than 2M stock picks 
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from more than 770,000 users (Hill & Ready-Campbell, 2011, p. 76–77). From this 
dataset, the authors find that, when the overall crowd was relied upon equally, the 
portfolio of recommendations outperformed the S&P 500 with a -23.2% returned from 
the crowd and a -35.5% returned from the S&P 500. Additionally, Hill and Ready-
Campbell find that when the crowd is thinned to those users with historically better 
averages, the expert crowd outperforms, moving forward in the future, both the larger 
population and the S&P500, although no metrics were provided (Hill & Ready-Campbell, 
2011, p. 95).  
While intriguing, what lasting value do these studies on forums, searches, and 
tweets provide? Because all of the studies used historical relationships to predict 
historical results it is difficult to assess what predictive powers the studies have on the 
days after their publication. As was briefly discussed in Chapter III, some evidence 
suggests that predictive economic characteristics degrade overtime. This was the case 
with both Bernanke’s interest-rate spread indicator for broader economic growth as well 
as Kozhan and Salmon’s Limit Order Book model for economic value (Bernanke, 1990, 
p. 52) (Kozhan & Salmon, 2010, p. 20). These studies reinforce the notion, integral to 
both the efficient market hypothesis and the adaptive market hypothesis, that information 
expires and it generally expires quickly. One vivid illustration of this point is 
demonstrated in a 2011 paper, “Event-Driven Trading and the ‘New News’”. In it, the 
authors find that considerable pre-event information leak significantly degrading short-
term returns of those looking to capitalize on news as it happens. The research shows that 
near “90% of the return [occurs] prior to, or to the left of, the event line” with the 
phenomenon depicted graphically in Figure 28 (Leinweber & Sisk, 2011, p. 113). The 
graph shows short-term positive and negative returns, measured in seconds, immediately 
preceding and after the news is released, denoted by the vertical bar midway through the 
chart. As observed, the majority of the returns, 90% by the authors’ estimates, have 
already occurred in the seconds leading up to the release.  
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Figure 28.  Twenty-Year News Event Studies for the S&P 500, 1984-2004 (from 
Leinweber and Sisk, 2011, p. 113) 
This seeming validation of the efficient market hypothesis and its derivative, 
adaptive market hypothesis may provide some clarity as to how the market may respond 
to the predictive indicators described above, from liquidity to social media, search 
metrics and beyond.   
F. ADAPTIVE MARKET HYPOTHESIS AND A RETURN TO EFFICIENT 
MARKETS 
In 1970, two decades before his three factor CAPM contributions, economist 
Eugene Fama postulated the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) in the paper ‘‘Efficient 
Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work.” EMH postulates that prices 
in markets, be the asset, bond, stock, options or any other class, reflect varying levels of 
information, depending on the form of EMH to which the investor subscribes (Brown, 
2010, p. 2). The lowest threshold form of EMH, the so-called “weak” form EMH, states 
that the price of the asset will reflect only all historical information. The “semi-strong” 
form states that the price reflects all historical information and current publically 
available information. The “strong” form of EMH claims the price of the asset will 
always reflect all information, both public and private (Fama, 1970, p. 383). Fama 
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outlined three market conditions sufficient to support the “strong” form of EMH: i) Zero 
transactions costs, ii) All available information is free to all market participants, and iii) 
All market participants agree on the implications of the available information (Fama, 
1970, p. 387). Fama is quick to admit that no such market operates under these conditions 
in reality, and counters that these conditions are not necessary for market efficiency. 
Specially, Fama claims a market may be efficient when a “sufficient number of investors 
have ready access to available information” and “disagreements among investors about 
the implications … does not in itself imply market inefficiency” (Fama, 1970, p. 388). 
From the outset, Fama is apprehensive of “strong” form EMH and does “not expect it to 
be literally true”. He “[contends] that there is no important evidence against … the weak 
and semi-strong form tests … and limited evidence against the hypothesis in the strong 
form” (Fama, 1970, p. 388). Through various academic studies and research, the semi-
strong form of EMH has shown to be the most accurate (or least inaccurate) model for 
predicting asset pricing. While semi-strong EMH is mostly accepted by the academic 
community, the community of investment professions has been hesitant to endorse the 
theory, namely because of the theory’s ultimate conclusions – that financial advisors, as 
well as mutual fund and wealth managers, will not be able to consistently outperform the 
broader market using only publically available information (Sorensen, 1983, p. 29). It is 
fortunate for Fama that this skepticism permeates the investor landscape. As pointed out 
by James Lorie and Mary Hamilton three years after EMH’s publication in 1970: 
This is a curious paradox. In order for the hypothesis to be true, it is 
necessary for many investors to disbelieve it. That is, market prices will 
promptly and fully reflect what is knowable about the companies whose 
shares are traded only if investors seek to earn superior returns, make 
conscientious and competent efforts to learn about the companies whose 
securities are traded, and analyze relevant information promptly and 
perceptively. If that effort were abandoned, the efficiency of the market 
would diminish rapidly. (Lorie & Hamilton, 1973, p. 98) 
All three forms of EMH are predicated, to varying degrees, on both the disbelief 
in EMH as being accurate and on maintaining investor attention to the information from 
which that particular form draws its pricings (e.g., historical, all publically available, or 
all information). Nevertheless, given the overload of the global information age, these 
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suppositions, particularly the latter, seems increasingly difficult to accept. As the late 
economist Herbert Simon so aptly said, “A wealth of information, creates a poverty of 
attention” (Simon, 1971, pp. 40-41).  
This poverty of attention has unavoidably led to the treatment of focus as a scarce 
commodity rather than a limitless lubricant greasing the wheels of all markets to 
efficiency. The behaviorally-adjusted, adaptive market hypothesis accommodates this 
deficit of attention by, instead of a rigid faith that capital prices reflect all information, 
past and present, advocating that “prices reflect as much information as dictated by the 
combination of environmental conditions and the number and nature of ‘species’ in the 
economy or, to use a more appropriate biological term, the ecology” (Lo, 2004, p. 23). In 
other words, evolutionary forces may shape the market more than EMH would suggest. 
Specifically in AMH, as information or derivations of information relate to short-terms 
returns, as profitable ventures are exploited, they disappear. Nevertheless, “new 
opportunities are also constantly being created as certain species die out, as others are 
born, and as institutions and business conditions change” (Lo, 2004, p. 24). Furthermore, 
these new opportunities are destined to arise because new and surviving species will have 
varied evolutionary background, which will lend the market participants to differing 
investing focuses (Lo, 2004, p. 25–26).   
In fact, under the premises of both the semi-strong and strong form of the EMH 
framework, none of the information discussed and derived above, be it liquidity, interest-
rate spreads, tweets, search queries, or forum posts, would effectively predict future price 
movements for the target securities. Yet the success of these indicators and others are not 
a contradiction under the AMH. AMH would stipulate that these indicators may be 
successful in the short-run, until mass attentions shift to these practices, thus eliminating 
any would-be gains from information derived from aggregating liquidity, SVI, et cetera. 
Encouraging for AMH, this has been observed as the case for both Bernanke and Kozhan 
and Salmon’s research.  
To summarize this chapter began by addressing the rise of dark pools, firstly 
focusing on the significant advantages they provide large market participants (i.e., 
reduction in information leakage) and more broadly retail investors (i.e., market 
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competition driving down transaction costs). From there the chapter addressed a variety 
of unintended consequences of dark pools ranging from market fragmentation, to 
regulation complexity, and to a lack of transparency. This opaque nature presents 
considerable real world implementation challenges for the proposed liquidity-based 
model, both in macro and micro levels, and, as such, the chapter concluded by examining 
a variety of alternative current research topics on pricing models.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH  
That mysterious fragile flower where price is part perception, part 
valuation, and part hope or lack thereof.  
—Financial Manager Bill Gross (1944– ) 
 
While dark pools represent a clear denial of much of the information required to 
perform an algorithmic-based liquidity assessment, such as the one outlined in Chapter 
III, they are not the only condition and concern for algorithmic trading. Deception, that is 
“the deliberate misrepresentation of reality done to gain a competitive advantage,” poses 
a considerable risk, as many of the programmers of such algorithms discovered on April 
23, 2013 (Daniel & Herbig, 1981, p. 3). On the 23rd, at 1:07 in the afternoon, a news 
tweet broadcasted via the Associated Presses (AP) to nearly 2 million followers, 
announced that “Breaking: Two Explosions in the White House and Barack Obama is 
injured” (Fisher, 2013). The broader market immediately reacted with the DJIA shedding 
nearly 150 points, or $136 billion in market value (Fisher, 2013). News spread quickly 
that the tweet had been a fake; the result of a phishing scheme orchestrated by cyber 
vandals, the Syrian Electronic Army, a grouping of advocates and possibly surrogates of 
the Assad regime (Fisher, 2013). By 1:10 PM, the market had fully recovered and the 
associated press had regained control of their quite influential Twitter feed. While the 
Syrian Electronic Army offered neither proof nor motive for the hacking, the incident 
represented a clear financial opportunity for those with advance warning. 
Had the algorithms designed to make buy and sell decisions that led to the 
temporary collapse been more complex, the credibility of the tweet could have been 
significantly discounted as demonstrated in the aforementioned work of Castillo et al 
(2012). Many journalists were immediately wary of the tweet for two reasons, 1) the 
tweet led with “Breaking:” whereas standard AP tweet format dictated such a tweet 
would have led with BREAKING in all capitals, and 2) standard AP protocol always 
referred to the President by his title (Jackson, 2013). These intuitive suspicions echo the 
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words of military deception academic Bart Whaley when, in his 2002 compilation on the 
topic, he writes, “deceptions can be detected regardless of the field in which they occur” 
(Godson & Wirtz, 2002, p. 182). Whaley continues, concluding that of his 46 case studies 
of successful counterdeception all, save one, “used standard logical systems (both 
deductive and inductive) in combination with intuitive methods” (Godson & Wirtz, 2002, 
p. 218–219). No great leap of faith is required to conclude that, with adequate pattern 
recognition algorithms, these two deviations from standard AP tweet format 
“fingerprints” could have been detected, and it could have been estimated that the tweet 
was most likely not credible. Even without prior knowledge of the hack, had such a 
credibly discount determination been made, an algorithm would have stood to make 
considerable short-term returns by taking the opposite side of the prevailing wisdom, 
showing that counterdeception is critical to not only avoiding a disadvantage, but gaining 
a competitive advantage, both on the battlefield and in the marketplace.  
 
Figure 29.  AP’s Hacked Tweet: Immediate Aftermath and Recovery (from Farrell, 2013) 
This is just one example of how important credibility and deception detection 
(i.e., counterdeception) should be to algorithmic and high-frequency trading systems. 
This final chapter will first provide a brief discussion tying military deception and 
counterdeception paradigms to automated financial decision models in order to ferret out 
misinformation for more effective assessments. From there, policy recommendations, for 
both regulators and market participants, are considered, key thesis points are reiterated, 
and broader implications of these ideas are addressed. Finally, the chapter concludes with 
future research suggestions and a closing case study.       
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A. GUNS AND BUTTER: SPEED OR CREDIBLITY? 
While orchestrating the deception campaign outlined in the Twitter example 
would be a clear violation of U.S. securities laws, and classified as securities fraud – not 
to mention the associated cyber crime and identity theft – profiting from such a campaign 
without prior knowledge of the deception is a decidedly foggier area of SEC regulation 
(FBI, 2005). The Twitter example also exposes a major tradeoff, the sacrifice of 
credibility for speed. High-frequency traders scrapping Twitter feed for pricing decisions 
did not accurately evaluate the credibility of the specific tweet, choosing instead to base 
credibility, and by extension pricing decisions, on the credibility of the Twitter user, AP. 
While this approach, assessing credibility of information on the historical credibility of 
the source, is not unreasonable and, in fact, is standard practice for intelligence agencies, 
anomaly detection protocols should still play a role, if only supporting, in assessments 
(Green, 2003, p. 3). When high-frequency pricing algorithms focus, not just the 
newsworthiness of the information, but also the inverse relationship between the 
probability of the specific event (e.g., an explosion at the White House), and the 
credibility of that information, as advocated by Shannon, increased scrutiny may have 
detected the outlined inconsistencies (Waltz, 1998, p. 58). Nevertheless, this increased 
scrutiny would have consumed precious clock cycles associated with the additional 
algorithmic complexity.  
To demonstrate just how valuable those clock cycles can be, consider the case of 
the two-second advanced copy of the twice-monthly consumer sentiment report. It was 
reported in the Wall Street Journal that, until recently, the news and business-reporting 
agency, Thompson Reuters, sold early access to the widely read report on consumer 
sentiment compiled by the University of Michigan. For an annual fee, Thompson Reuters 
sold the report to institutional investors and news agencies at 9:55 AM, five minutes 
before the university publishes the findings to the Internet at 10:00 AM. Moreover, for an 
additional fee, Reuters distributed the report an additional two seconds earlier, at 9:54:58. 
While two seconds may sound inconsequential, it provided high-frequency trading firms 
ample time to make trades in anticipation of the broader market reaction that followed at 
9:55. On March 15th, 2013, one such HFT firm, Infinium Capital Management, bet 
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nearly 7 million shares that the broader market would fall in the two seconds prior to 
wide spread distribution of the report. Just as Infinium had predicted, the market did, in 
fact, decline in the wake of the weaker-than-expected report, netting the firm hundreds of 
thousands in profit in two seconds of trading (Mullins, 2013). Important to note, neither 
the University of Michigan, Thompson Reuters, nor Infinium broke any state law, federal 
regulation, or SEC regulation. Only reports released by the government are required by 
law to be available to all interested parties simultaneously.  
In July 2013, Thompson Reuters suspended their practice of releasing the report 
two seconds in advance to high-frequency clients, which had dramatic effects on market 
activity. To illustrate these effects, consider the volume of a broader market exchange 
traded fund tracking the S&P 500. In the 10-millisecond period immediately following 
the two-second-advanced copy’s release a year prior, July, 2012, an estimated 200,000 
shares were purchased and sold. Contrasting those 200,000 shares with the 500 that were 
traded in the 10-millisecond period after the suspension was enacted, the value of 
advance warning is both apparent and striking (Stewart, 2013, p. B1). Just as reasonable, 
though not without risk, university and government published reports are assumed as 
credible as Twitter feeds are of reputable organizations of the fourth estate.  
This tradeoff, time spent in credibility verification versus time spent executing 
trades based on the information, is unavoidable as every clock cycle spent verifying is 
one less cycle spent executing. Considering that the information landscape, and by 
extension financial decision inputs, are only likely to continue their expansion, striking 
the balance between the two activities, verification along with execution, will grow in 
importance for high-frequency and algorithmic traders moving forward. In addition to the 
execution opportunity cost, algorithmic credibly assessments, such as the pattern 
recognition approach described above, are also expected to have considerable real costs, 
both in IT infrastructure and human resources to build and test the tools necessary to 
detect anomalies and trade accordingly. Likely, however, the most costly approach would 
be to neglect credibility entirely, trade exclusively on rumor and hearsay, thus 
categorically forsaking verification in favor of execution speed. To reiterate, as the 
business model develops, the most successful algorithmic trading is likely a consequence 
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of striking the right balance between verification and speed, while where that balance lies 
is best left for future research and thoughtful consideration.      
B. RECOMMENDATIONS AND POLICY CHOICES 
Through the sources reviewed for this research, including working papers, journal 
articles, full-length texts, congressional testimony, newspaper, and industry publications, 
many dedicate at least of portion of their effort to the topic of policy recommendations 
and considerations in light of the evolving equity market landscape over the past decades. 
In that spirit, it will be of value to highlight here recurring and notable recommendations 
most appropriate for policy makers and industry leaders, given the topics addressed 
throughout this work. One recommendation, perhaps the wisest, that persisted across 
topics and advocates was “do no harm”. Tabb most elegantly addressed this advice in his 
congressional testimony when he read, “the U.S. markets are the deepest and most liquid 
on the globe. The markets are also complex and interrelated. Small changes can cause 
significant impact. So, first, do nothing radical. A radical shift of market structure will 
unquestionably hurt investors” (Reed & Crapo, 2012, p. 10). With that caution in mind, 
various policy considerations and recommendations are most easily segregated by 
separating those targeting dark pools from those addressing algorithmic and high-
frequency trading.   
1. Dark Pools: Audits, Matching, and Licenses  
Three recurring policy recommendations address the two primary concerns of the 
current exchange and dark pool landscape previously outlined in Chapter IV. The first 
concern, a lack of transparency, is, in no small measure, a balancing act between the need 
for a fair and level playing field, while maintaining the raison d'être of dark pools, which 
is to protect institutional investors from exploitation of information leakage. This concern 
could be addressed with comprehensive, confidential, ‘after the fact’ audit trails delivered 
only to regulatory agencies and more transparency in dark pool matching procedures. The 
second concern, market fragmentation, can be addressed by limiting the expansion of 
dark pool licenses, a limiting constraint well within the SEC’s purview (Reed & Crapo, 
2012, p. 11).   
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Two encouraged regulatory changes that, if enacted, kept confidential, and only 
forwarded to monitoring agencies, would have a “dramatic chilling effect on malicious 
behavior” in dark pools include audit trails (i.e., a comprehensive trade history) and 
unique identifiers (i.e., so as to easily identify market actors) (Reed & Crapo, 2012, pp. 
21, 37). These changes would preserve the protective role of the pools, while providing 
regulators recourse to hold manipulative and opportunistic participants accountable, by 
recreating market interactions in the days and weeks after the trades occurred. While no 
such requirement currently exists, if enacted, audit trails would also be useful in 
reconstructing trades in the wakes of extreme volatility and emergencies 
such as the flash crash in May 2010 (Reed & Crapo, 2012, pp. 21). Important to note, 
however, multiple authorities from academia to industry suggest that keeping the 
reporting contents, though not requirements, confidential is crucial to ensuring 
institutional investor confidence in such pools, as reliable sources of anonymous liquidity 
(Banks, 2010, p. 181). 
Many also agree that matching protocols need to be more transparent for dark 
pools and that substantial price improvements should also be required for internalized 
flow in order to circumvent those protocols prioritizing time arrival of limit orders 
(Banks, 2010, p. 179). For example, Lauer suggests a minimum price improvement of 
$.001 for new limit order to skip the queue of those orders already in the stack at that 
price point (Reed & Crapo, 2012, p. 37). Furthermore, others have suggested that the 
one-size-fits-all model currently applied to most tick-sizes and minimum price 
improvements, both in dark as with lit venues, is inappropriate. They believe instead a 
percentage of the trading price per share would be a better approach to minimizing 
unnecessary volatility and discourage liquidity detections algorithms (Reed & Crapo, 
2012, p. 9) (Tabb, 2012, p. 21). Conversely, minimum tick sizes and price improvements 
will widen bid/ask spreads, “[reducing] the probability of price improvement”, and 
“unintentionally force liquidity consumers [i.e., market orders]” to unregulated venues 
such as broker/dealer internalizers (NBIM, 2013, p. 17). 
Consequences stemming for market fragmentation, ultimately from the explosion 
of dark pools in the exchange landscape, also rank among the most pressing of concerns. 
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While rolling back those dark pools already licensed under Reg ATS is unrealistic, most 
recognize that limiting the fragmentation moving forward will not impede innovation or 
cause an unintended rise in recently reduced transaction costs. Furthermore, additional 
research is recommended to evaluate the optimal number of lit and dark exchanges, most 
likely as a function of the size of the equity market. Such research would be vital to 
calculating how many licenses should be issued, at what rate in order to maintain a 
balance for competitive forces, and an acceptable level of complexity between the 
investor and where the order is ultimately executed (Reed & Crapo, 2012, p. 11).   
2. HFT: Transaction Taxes, Resting Periods, and Kill Switches 
Beyond dark pools, some attention must be paid to recommendations for policy 
makers and regulators with regard to the expansion of high-frequency computer executed 
trading. Speaking on liquidity in a forum with former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker, 
Vanguard founder John Bogle revisited the famous words of an 18th century English poet 
when he mused, “[Samuel Johnson] had a saying, ‘Patriotism is the last refuge of the 
scoundrel.’ In this new fast-moving market, I’d advance the idea that liquidity is the last 
refuge of the scoundrel [emphasis in the original]” (Rostad, 2013, p.68). In light of 
studies revealing that 78% of all executed orders are HFT firms trading amongst 
themselves, and that nearly 40% of HFT orders are canceled in less than 50ms, supporters 
advancing HFT in the name of liquidity appear unjustified, even quite possibly, excessive 
(Zhang, 2010, p. 33) (Reed & Crapo, 2012, p. 36). While two of the three recurring 
recommendations—transaction taxes and minimum resting times—may adversely affect 
liquidity, the effect is not expected to be substantial, possibly having favorable impacts 
on volatility and exchange IT infrastructure. While the third recommendation, circuit 
breakers, is not expected to impact liquidity and volatility, outside of periods 
characterized as dangerous levels of volatility, however, it may place additional burdens 
on exchange infrastructure.    
While few in industry suggest or even address a financial transaction tax (FTT), 
probably for the predictable reasons one might imagine, academia and policy makers 
have studied such a proposal, remaining unburdened by the bottom lines plaguing their 
corporate peers. As previously and tangentially addressed by Summers and Summers, a 
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small FTT would marginally increase transactions costs thereby discouraging 
speculations and encouraging long term investing (1989, pp. 262–263). Although, under 
Section 31 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, the U.S. does have a transaction tax of 
$.0042 per trade, most acknowledge this fee, which ultimately funds the SEC budget, is 
too minimal to have positive impacts on volatility or adverse effects on liquidity (SEC, 
2013) (Pollin, 2012, p. 98). Furthermore, raising the FTT to .05 percent of the trade for 
equities with a sliding scale for other asset classes, paid by both the buyer and seller, is 
estimated to raise treasury revenues by $350 billion or 62% of the president’s 2015 
projected budget deficit of $564 billion (Pollin, 2012, p. 98)(OMB, 2014, p. 163). 
Nevertheless, allowing Lauer to voice the broader industry concerns with regard to a 
national FTT, he writes in 2012, “I do not believe a Financial Transaction Tax would 
have the intended consequences. We have seen dramatic evidence of fleeing liquidity in 
those markets that have adopted this tax [namely under European market reforms such as 
the .05 percent FTT applied in the U.K.]” (Reed & Crapo, 2012, p. 72).  
Far less controversial for government, industry, and academia is the 
recommendation of a minimum resting time. Under such a regulation, limit orders could 
only be canceled after a minimum resting time on the books had expired. While specific 
recommendations range from 20 ms to an entire minute, general consensus appears that a 
pilot program should explore minimum resting periods of 50 ms to determine liquidity, 
spread, and volatility effects (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2007, p. 5) (Reed & Crapo, 2012, pp. 36, 
72). Brewer et al. of the California Institute of Technology examined the projected effects 
of minimum resting time using simulations, with conflicting conclusions. On the one 
hand, the authors’ research and simulations showed that, “requiring minimum resting 
times may be helpful in preventing instabilities in the market” such as the extreme 
volatility during the May 2010 flash crash (Brewer, Cvitanic, & Plott, 2012, p. 13). They 
do, however, add a caveat, pointing out that minimum resting times will only be effective 
when high frequency cancellations are the cause of such instability, a causal conclusion 
for which evidence is inconclusive. This ultimately leaves Brewer et al. less confident 
about resting times effectiveness in general (Brewer, Cvitanic, & Plott, 2012, pp. 13, 18). 
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The final recommendation, and perhaps most the innocuous, is the application of 
circuit breakers, also referred to as “automated kill switches” or simply “kill switches”. 
This reform would require exchange mechanisms to stop trading during periods of 
extreme volatility or uncertainty. Most sources were scant on details outlining when 
acceptable, healthy volatility suddenly crosses the line to intolerable, a factor not 
insignificant when considering implementation. Most approached the kill switches not by 
targeting the entire market, but rather HFT firm specific switches, in order to isolate 
rogue algorithms acting unpredictably, which is typically a result of bugs or glitches in 
the underlying logic (Reed & Crapo, 2012, p. 47). The most notorious example of which 
occurred on August 1st, 2012, when market maker and liquidity provider, Knight Capital 
Group, released untested algorithms on the broader market. Shortly after morning trading 
began, Knight Capital’s algorithm went on a purchasing spree, biding up share values on 
a wide range of companies, from well-known large caps, such as General Electric, to the 
obscure, such as Wizzard Software Corp (WZE.A). Ultimately, share prices reached 
unsustainable levels; for instance WZE.A quickly reached $14.76 a share, from its 
previous closing value of $3.50 (Valetkevitch & Mikolajczak, 2012). When prices 
eventually returned to where they had begun the day, Knight’s algorithm sold the entirety 
of the group’s holding, locking in a $440 million dollar loss within 45 minutes of the 
opening bell (Popper, 2012). In reality, two failures occurred in those first 45 minutes of 
trading. When automatic kill switches did not catch the errant code, then the fault became 
a human failure to monitor and stop the offending trading algorithm. When speaking on 
this episode Tabb correctly identified the problem when he wrote, “An electronic trading 
problem is only an electronic trading problem for at most a minute – after that it is a 
human problem” (Tabb, 2012, p. 17). While mandatory, automated, and firm specific kill 
switches may be able to stop unexpected algorithmic behavior, those switches are not 
expected to remove the sentient from the loop, monitoring both processes and trading 
decisions.  
C. CONCLUDING: TREES, FORESTS, AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS  
This thesis began by first building a solid understanding of global and domestic 
financial market by exploring the evolution of concepts, principles, and structures of 
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those markets. From that foundation, the original capital asset pricing model, first 
proposed by Sharpe in 1964 was examined in a broad review of literature, focused not 
just on the model, but also its critics. Following the academic evolution of CAPM, the 
thesis proceeded to explore research focusing on the effects and properties of the modern 
market phenomena of dark pools and high-frequency trading. Now, with a more 
sophisticated understanding of liquidity, sensitivity, and volatility, the thesis proposed a 
short-term adjustment to CAPM’s β, labeled β', based on liquidity metrics derived from 
both sides of the limit order book.  
Nevertheless, considerable obstacles to implementation of such a model exist and 
are beneficially appreciated under information operation paradigms. Denial, closely 
related to operations security, is one such obstacle and impedes the model in large part 
due to the proliferation of alternative trading systems and internalizers. These dark pools 
and broker/dealer internalizers have a variety of motivations, though none as promoted as 
the protection against information leakage for large institutional orders. Even though 
some of these systems hide liquidity by design and others hide it by consequence, the 
effect is the same; accurate assessments of broader market liquidity is impaired. 
Algorithms designed to detect liquidity, present false liquidity, and otherwise manipulate 
limit order books present another potential obstacle. Although not always malicious, 
these algorithms are addressed as another weakness for the proposed model. Though not 
a specific obstacle for the proposed pricing assessment, the final obstacle to asset pricing, 
in general, is misinformation and deception in the marketplace. As algorithms 
increasingly make pricing decisions in fractions of seconds, credible assessments have 
been neglected. Such neglected assessments have real cost, not only in lost execution 
opportunity, but also in infrastructure and complexity. Critical to long-term and short-
term success is striking the appropriate balance between investment made in verification 
and time spent in execution. In conclusion, the thesis offered recurring recommendations 
for policy makers and regulators, principally regarding the proliferation of dark pools and 
increasing share of high-frequency/algorithmic trading.  
As market landscapes shift, careful deliberation and anticipation of unintended 
third order effects will continue to be paramount, before even incremental policy changes 
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should be adopted. Moving forward, it will be just as critical to balance those effects with 
the unavoidable temptation to embrace the idea, as Mitchell did in 1929, that the markets 
are “fundamentally sound” (Galbraith, 1961, p. 102). Given that Knight Capital was 
responsible for roughly 11 percent of all market activity between January and May—well 
before their August ruin—demonstrates that concentrating exchange activity into the 
hands of few could have devastating effects on the many (Popper, 2012). Compounded 
with few reporting requirements, aging IT infrastructure, and the anonymous cloak dark 
pools provide, participants, regulators and monitoring agencies continue to be 
“hopelessly outgunned,” both in enforcement and forensic reconstruction (Reed & Crapo, 
2012, p. 19). These discouragements aside, the future of global equity markets, in 
general, and the U.S, in particular, appears quite bright. Never have transaction costs 
been lower or liquidity higher, as U.S. markets continue to show “strength and resiliency” 
five years after the end of the most recent financial crisis (Reed & Crapo, 2012, p. 
1)(Hau, 2006, p. 863).     
D. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK  
First and foremost, testing the modified capital asset pricing model proposed in 
Chapter III, with a statistically significant dataset from historical limit order books, for 
accuracy, is the most pertinent and obvious focus of future work. Beyond this, 
reassessing the accuracy of the model periodically as the focus of market participants 
shift may be significant, in light of the adaptive market hypothesis discussion in Chapter 
IV. If the modified model were found to be considerably accurate at estimating short-
term returns, as anticipated, the AMH would suggest a degradation of these predictive 
powers overtime, as market focus shifts to eliminate these advantages. Many of the 
challenges explored in the second half of Chapter IV and in this chapter, also warrant 
additional examination. Specifically, advocated recommendations should be scrutinized 
in simulations where natural experiments are unavailable. Given encouraging results, 
pilot programs would provide the next logical step, before widespread implementation is 
ultimately adopted.   
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E. PARTING VIGNETTE 
In September 2008, at 1:30 in the morning, an Orlando Sentinel article, first 
published six-years prior, in 2002, announced the imminent bankruptcy filing of United 
Airlines (UAL). At that hour, a single page-view of the article was sufficient for the 
Google News algorithms to promote the “breaking” news as among the “most viewed 
stories” of the day. The piece was then posted to Bloomberg, and the comedy of errors 
that followed ultimately resulted in a 76% loss of United Airlines’ market value in six 
minutes, all because neither human nor algorithm simply checked the publication date of 
the original source (Leinweber, 2011, p. 110). By the time trading was halted, UAL had 
lost more than $1 billion in value, and although much of that value was restored after 
trading resumed, the company still finished the day down more than 10%, even after 
calmly explaining that they were not, if fact, entering bankruptcy for a second time in six 
years (Maynard, 2008). Algorithmic and human errors abound in this costly anecdote. 
Google News failed to account that very few stories are read at 1:30 am, and so those that 
are may unintentionally be promoted to a wider audience than appropriate. The staffer 
that posted the story to Bloomberg failed to check the publication date, simply relying on 
Google’s historical credibility to promote timely items to most read status. Finally, the 
financial scrapers and bots, tools of their underlying algorithms, combing the news of the 
day, failed to check the simplest of metadata—a timestamp. Somewhat surprising, 
although not shocking, the stock price failed to recover after the company publically 
addressed the rumors, emphatically denying the bankruptcy murmurs. Unfortunately, it 
was too late—the seeds of doubt had been sown and residual fear remained more difficult 
to remove than it was to plant. United Airlines finished the day as a company $120 
million lighter in value, because of at least three missteps from algorithms and humans 
alike—not counting the originator, the as yet unidentified misanthrope, the midnight 
bearer of the otherwise expired news.  
Our decisions to do something positive … can only be taken as the result 
of animal spirits—a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and 
not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits 
multiplied by quantitative probabilities. 
—Economist John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) 
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